Shrimati Maneka Gandhi,
Hon’ble Minister of Women and Child Development,
New Delhi, India.
Young love often reported as rape in our ‘cruel society’ – The Hindu
“I lay the blame for a lot of this at the door of Parliament,” lawyer and leading women’s rights activist Vrinda Grover said.
In January 2013, Seema (name changed), who had moved to Delhi from rural Bihar with her brother went to the Hanuman temple on Delhi’s Panchkuian Road with 19-year-old Sameer (name changed). He put vermilion on her forehead, the couple embraced and now married in their own eyes, they ran away to Sameer’s native village in Samastipur. By May, Seema, now pregnant, was in a court-mandated shelter home for young women visited only by Sameer when he got bail, accused of kidnapping and raping his young love.
The content of 600 court judgements analysed by The Hindu and interviews with complainants, judges and police officers illuminate for this first time the real stories behind the headlines on the national capitals rape statistics.
As Part 1 of the series showed, one-fifth of the trials ended because the complainant did not appear or turned hostile.
Of the cases fully tried, over 40% dealt with consensual sex, usually involving the elopement of a young couple and the girl’s parents subsequently charging the boy with rape. Another 25% dealt with “breach of promise to marry”. Of the 162 remaining cases, men preying on young children in slums was the most common type of offence.
These numbers too do not on their own illuminate the stories behind these numbers; for this, The Hindu interviewed judges, prosecutors, police officers, complainants, accused, lawyers and activists most of them under condition of anonymity because they were not free to publicly discuss confidential rape trials. What emerged were heart-rending stories and the role of the police and judiciary.
‘Teenage love drama’
Of the 460 cases dealing with sexual assault in Delhi’s district courts in 2013 that went to a full trial, 174 involved or seemed to involve runaway young couples like Seema and Sameer, The Hindu found. This was especially true for inter-caste and inter-religious couples.
Across the system, there was some amount of concern and sympathy for these consenting couples, especially among judges. Ruling on Seema and Sameer’s case in October 2013, Additional Sessions Judge Dharmesh Sharma said, “The instant case racks [sic] up a perennial problem being faced by all of us on the judicial side: what should be the judicial response to elopement cases like the instant one… This life drama is enacted, played and repeated everyday in the Police Stations and Courts…” Of the case before him, Judge Sharma noted, “This case is a teenage love drama where our dysfunctional cruel society and the justice system have separated the two love birds and have taught them a bitter lesson.”
“We get innumerable such cases in Lucknow too,” Seema Mishra, lawyer and women’s rights activists with Association for Advocacy and Legal Initiatives (AALI), said. AALI has been at the forefront of the pushing for women’s right to choose sexual relationships, which is at the heart of the 174 cases The Hindu looked at. In case after case, as well as in interviews with The Hindu, the behaviour of the girls’ parents was shocking: they arrive at the hotel the couple has eloped to and drag them home, they beat and even injure the couple (in one case breaking the girl’s spine), they threaten her even with acid, they force her to submit to invasive medical tests and in many cases, even to an abortion.
In Judge Sharma’s case, he was able to acquit Sameer since Seema was over the age of consent for sex at the time – 16 years. However now that the Criminal Law Amendment Act (2013) is in force, the age of consent now stands at 18. “I lay the blame for a lot of this at the door of Parliament,” lawyer and leading women’s rights activist Vrinda Grover said. “By raising the age of consent, they have ensured such cases of consensual sex being called ‘rape’ are just going to multiply.”
Promise of marriage
Judges, prosecutors and police officers tended to be far less sympathetic towards the other major area of concern – the 109 cases which deal with “breach of promise to marry”. The argument used by prosecutors in these cases is that if a woman had sexual relations with a man only under a false promise of marriage by him, her consent was not free as it was obtained through deceit. However in most such cases, showing that the accused never intended to marry the complainant becomes hard to prove, unless he is already married to someone else and hiding it.
“You might say it is wrong, but when the girl’s father comes to the police station and says she has been ruined, a policeman will tend to take the father’s side,” one senior Delhi police explained. More often than not, he said, the FIR was a way to force a man attempting to call off a marriage into going through with it; in a third of such cases The Hindu looked at, the woman deposed in court that they were now married and hence she no longer accused him of rape.
“Your family discovers you have been having relations with a man for five years and now he has called it off because of pressure from his family,” one complainant who lost her case explained. “Before you know what is happening, your father and uncle have gone to the police station and you are forced into this. Everyone tells you that if you do not go along with it, you will never get married,” she said.
“Frankly I think this shouldn’t be counted as rape. It comes from a patriarchal context, from the premium placed on a woman’s chastity. But if we want to talk of women’s agency, we cannot have it both ways,” Ms. Grover said, a sentiment shared by several other feminist lawyers.
Rape as we know it
The 161 remaining cases look a lot closer to what is conventionally referred to as rape. Nearly half of these involved an adult neighbour preying on a minor child of a neighbour or a vulnerable woman sleeping outdoors or alone at home, most took place in slums, and had a conviction rate of over 75%. “Mothers like me have to work all day and are not able to keep an eye on our children,” one mother who secured a conviction in the rape of her three-year-old by a neighbour, said in tears. The medical investigation and courtroom terrified her, the woman said, but her family supported her.
In such cases, the consistent testimony of the complainant played the most important role. Judges were usually willing to convict in the absence of medical evidence, and in one case, Additional Sessions Judge Renu Bhatnagar convicted a man of raping a mentally challenged minor girl even though she was unable to depose in court apart from nodding. However in at least two cases where the complainant admitted that she met the accused alone voluntarily but did not consent to sex, judges disbelieved the woman’s testimony.
The judgement in the December 16 gang-rape formed part of The Hindu’s study and was notable in its length, detail and unprecedented extent of medical evidence. It was one of only 12 rapes heard in 2013 that were alleged to have been perpetrated by strangers, and all of the others pre-dated it.
The stories behind Delhi’s sexual assault statistics indicate that the image created by police statistics alone might be a misleading one.
(This is part two of a three-part series. Part 3 appears tomorrow: The Journey from FIR to Judgement)
More than Society, we all must give a Big Thanks to radical Women activist like #RajKumari, #ShibitaKrishan and all Mombatiwala, who advocated such Unfair, Biased LAW to promote the #Fake Cases, where any girls or Women can term any Men a Rapist only by her Verbal allegations, without any Medical Evidence with out any restrictions of time limit.
Men’s Rights Association and their associated NGO recommended Gender Natural ( replace men/women to person) , Evidence based Criminal law along with a strong Misuse Clause like Lokpal Act to the Government, but all gone in deaf ears till date.
If you make any criminal law Non-bailble , where the FIR can be registered only by Verbal allegations , such LAW will only promote the #Fakecases and#LegalTerrorism, as no one Born in Raja Harish Chandra Family , that they will never lie.
More disturbing our WCD minister without going to details of cases and find the way to protect our Child from wrongly termed rapist , propose to treat the Boys below 18 years old as adult .
Wonder if, our WCD and Government can’t reform a Child, how they will reform a country?
We once again send our proposal to WCD and request to amend the Rape law on Top Priority along with Caution, which we had bring to your notice earlier also.
If you really want the IPC376, #IPC354 should not be misused left, right and center, like the way in 498A/DV act the word “Relative” misused, amend the law as per our suggestion.
Be ready the Rape statistics will be double in next two years and it will became another extortion, blackmailing and easy money earning business for all Advocate, Police and greedy people.
Summary of our Recommendations and Request to meet your MP/MLA/Ministers and demand:
1) Make Rape Law Gender Neutral as in other countries of the globe
2) Relationship cheating cases should not be allowed to be converted into rape cases which suck the scare resources from genuine rape cases.
3) False complaints of Rape cases should be punished severely, so that genuine cases like ‘Nirbhaya’, gets justice.
4) Introduce the much required police reforms and use Technology to increase conviction rates of rape cases and punish those file false cases.
· All references to “Man” or “Woman” must be replaced with the word “Person” or “Whosoever”
· All references to “His” or “Her” to be must be replaced with the word “His or Her”
· All references to “He” or “She” must be replaced with the word “He or She”
· All references to the word ‘Husband” or “Wife” must be replaced with the word “Spouse”
MRA Amol Kurhe
Mens Rights Association
CALCUTTA HC- The future salary not being a tangible corporeal property the same cannot be attached for recovery of the arrear maintenance.
In the case of Md. Jahangir Khan Vs. Mst. Manoara Bibi, reported in 1992 Cri L.J. 83, a Division Bench of our High Court held that the future salary not being a tangible corporeal property the same cannot be attached for recovery of the arrear maintenance.
Form No. J (1)
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
The Hon’ble Justice Ashim Kumar Roy
C.R.R. NO. 399 of 2007
Pranati Mukherjee & Anr.
For Petitioners : Mr. Jayanta Nath Saha For O.P. No. 1 : Mr. Subhasish Chakraborty Ms. Shreyashi Biswas
Mr. Soumya Chakraborty
Ms. Sasita Halder
Heard On : August 26th, 2008.
Judgment On : 12-11-2008.
In connection with a maintenance proceeding under Section 125 of the code of Criminal Procedure, the present petitioner was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 2,000/- per month to his wife, the opposite party herein as her monthly maintenance. Since the petitioner allegedly made no payment the wife/opposite party moved an application under Section 125 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the court concerned for enforcement of the said order and for realization and recovery of the amount due i.e. a sum of Rs. 22,000/- relating to the period from February 2005 to December 2005, which give rise to Misc. Case No. 50 of 2006 and the Learned Additional Presiding Judge, Family Court, Calcutta made an order directing that a sum of Rs. 1,000/- per month be deducted from the pension account of the petitioner and be credited to the savings account of the wife/opposite party on and from January, 2007 during the coming 22 months towards the recovery of arrear maintenance in addition to Rs. 2,000/- per month which has already been directed to be deducted from the pension account of the petitioner towards the payment of future maintenance. The petitioner challenged the said order on the ground in default of payment of maintenance allowance and for recovery of the same the future pension cannot beattached.
2. Heard the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the parties. Perused the impugned order as well as other materials on record. Considered their respective submissions.
3. In the case of Md. Jahangir Khan Vs. Mst. Manoara Bibi, reported in 1992 Cri L.J. 83, a Division Bench of our High Court held that the future salary not being a tangible corporeal property the same cannot be attached for recovery of the arrear maintenance.
4. It may be noted that the Learned Judge also in her order observed that no future income can be attached as she was of the view since same was not salary but was pension to which the petitioner is entitled during her lifetime the same can be attached. In this regard the observations made by the Division Bench of our High Court in the aforesaid case of Md. Jahangir Khan Vs. Mst. Manoara Bibi (supra) would be very relevant and is quoted below; Para 13. “A single Judge of Orissa High Court relying on a Karnataka decision in Rudraiah V. Muddagangamma, 1985 Cri LJ 707 sought to make a synthesis in Surekha V. Ramahari, 1990 Cri LJ 639. His Lordship while agreeing that only tangible corporeal property could be attached held that salary when becomes due was liable to attachment. According to the learned Judge, writ of attachment should remain dormant and would revive at the end of the month. With deep respect to the learned Judge, wecannot accept his view for the foregoing reasons. On similar reasons, we are unable to agree with the finding of the referring Judge.”
5. Thus, the future pension of the petitioner not being tangible and still not been earned by him same cannot be attached.
6. The impugned order is thus set aside and accordingly the criminal revision is allowed.
The Learned Judge is directed to proceed with the matter against the petitioner who is in alleged default of making payment of maintenance allowance and to enforce the order of maintenance in accordance with the provisions of Section 125 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Both the parties are directed to appear before the court concerned within fortnight from this date and the Learned Magistrate is directed to take necessary steps immediately thereafter. In view of the disposal of the main criminal revision C.R.R. No. 399 of 2007, the application for modification and/or variation of the order dated February 2007 passed by the Hon’ble Mr. Justice P.N. Sinha being CRAN No. 1800 of 2007 stands disposed of.
Urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties, as expeditiously as possible.
( Ashim Kumar Roy, J. )
On the 2nd of July 2014, the Honorable Supreme Court of India gave a landmark judgment while granting interim bail to an accused under Section 498A of the IPC popularly known as the Dowry Law.
Watch Amol kurhe on abp news- Is the dowry law being misused in the country?: http://t.co/WkE27MmpyT
SC: SC: dowry law the most misused, abused law in India. Police shld follow 9 point checklist as per 41 crpc
The Supreme Court on Wednesday said women were increasingly using the anti-dowry law to harass in-laws and restrained police from mechanically arresting the husband and his relatives on mere lodging of a complaint under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.
Citing very low conviction rate in such cases, it directed the state governments to instruct police “not to automatically arrest when a case under Section 498A of IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters (check list) provided under Section 41 of Criminal Procedure Code“.
Section 41 lays down a nine-point check list police to weigh the need to arrest after examining the conduct of the accused, in cluding possibility of his absconding.
If police arrested the accused, “the magistrate, while authorizing detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms of Section 41 and only after recording its satisfaction…will authorize detention,“ the bench bench of Justices C K Prasad and P C Ghose said. It also said that this checklist for arrest and detention would apply to all offences, which are punished with a prison term less than 7 years. Punishment under Section 498A is a maximum of three years but it had been made a cognizable and nonbailable offence, which made grant of bail to the accused a rarity in courts.
But the court singled out the dowry harassment cases as the most abused and misused provision, though the legislature had enacted it with the laudable object to prevent harassment of women in matrimonial homes.
Writing the judgment for the bench, Justice Prasad said there had been a phenomenal increase in dowry harass
ment cases in India in the last few years. “The fact that Section 498A is a cognizable and non-bailable offence has lent it a dubious place of pride amongst the provisions that are used as weapons rather than shield by disgruntled wives,” he said.
“The simplest way to harass is to get the husband and his relatives arrested under this provision. In a quite number of cases, bed-ridden grand-fathers and grandmothers of the husbands, their sisters living abroad for decades are arrested,” he said.
or long now, concerns have been expressed about stringent anti-dowry laws being misused by some women to harass or blackmail their in-laws. These apprehensions have not only been expressed by courts, women’s activists too have acknowledged that such misuse is not unknown. It was, therefore, necessary for the law to take this reality into account.
The apex court’s order does just that. Automatic arrest was one of the provisions that lent itself most to abuse and making it mandatory for a magistrate to sanction arrest should help curb this abuse of law. Beyond that, there’s a lesson for all of us – social ills can’t be eliminated just by enacting laws, as India tends to do. Society as a whole needs to join the movement against them.
Pls find the judgment below:-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1277 OF 2014
(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) No.9127 of 2013)
ARNESH KUMAR ….. APPELLANT
STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. …. RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
Chandramauli Kr. Prasad
The petitioner apprehends his arrest in a case under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as IPC) and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The maximum sentence provided under Section 498-A IPC is imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and fine whereas the maximum sentence provided under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is two years and with fine.
Petitioner happens to be the husband of respondent no.2 Sweta Kiran. The marriage between them was solemnized on 1st July, 2007. His attempt to secure anticipatory bail has failed and hence he has knocked the door of this Court by way of this Special Leave Petition.
In sum and substance, allegation levelled by the wife against the appellant is that demand of Rupees eight lacs, a maruti car, an
air-conditioner, television set etc. was made by her mother-in-law and father-in-law and when this fact was brought to the appellant’s notice, he supported his mother and threatened to marry another woman. It has been alleged that she was driven out of the matrimonial home due to non- fulfilment of the demand of dowry.
Denying these allegations, the appellant preferred an application for anticipatory bail which was earlier rejected by the learned Sessions Judge and thereafter by the High Court.
There is phenomenal increase in matrimonial disputes in recent years. The institution of marriage is greatly revered in this country. Section 498-A of the IPC was introduced with avowed object to combat the menace of harassment to a woman at the hands of her husband and his relatives. The fact that Section 498-A is a cognizable and non-bailable offence has lent it a dubious place of pride amongst the provisions that are used as weapons rather than shield by disgruntled wives. The simplest way to harass is to get the husband and his relatives arrested under this provision. In a quite number of cases, bed-ridden grand-fathers and grand-mothers of the husbands, their sisters living abroad for decades are arrested. “Crime in India 2012 Statistics” published by National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs shows arrest of 1,97,762 persons all over India during the year 2012 for offence under Section 498-A of the IPC, 9.4% more than the year 2011. Nearly a quarter of those arrested under this provision in 2012 were women i.e. 47,951 which depicts that mothers and sisters of the husbands were liberally included in their arrest net. Its share is 6% out of the total persons arrested under the crimes committed under Indian Penal Code. It accounts for 4.5% of total crimes committed under different sections of penal code, more than any other crimes excepting theft and hurt. The rate of charge-sheeting in cases under Section 498A, IPC is as high as 93.6%, while the conviction rate is only 15%, which is lowest across all heads. As many as 3,72,706 cases are pending trial of which on current estimate, nearly 3,17,000 are likely to result in acquittal.
Arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom and cast scars forever. Law makers know it so also the police. There is a battle between the law makers and the police and it seems that police has not learnt its lesson; the lesson implicit and embodied in the Cr.PC. It has not come out of its colonial image despite six decades of independence, it is largely considered as a tool of harassment, oppression and surely not considered a friend of public. The need for caution in exercising the drastic power of
arrest has been emphasized time and again by Courts but has not yielded desired result. Power to arrest greatly contributes to its arrogance so also the failure of the Magistracy to check it. Not only this, the power of arrest is one of the lucrative sources of police corruption. The attitude to arrest first and then proceed with the rest is despicable. It has become a handy tool to the police officers who lack sensitivity or act with oblique motive.
Law Commissions, Police Commissions and this Court in a large number of judgments emphasized the need to maintain a balance between individual liberty and societal order while exercising the power of arrest. Police officers make arrest as they believe that they possess the power to do so.
As the arrest curtails freedom, brings humiliation and casts scars forever, we feel differently. We believe that no arrest should be made only because the offence is non-bailable and cognizable and therefore, lawful for the police officers to do so. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing, the justification for the exercise of it is quite another. Apart from power to arrest, the police officers must be able to justify the reasons thereof. No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence made against a person. It would be prudent and wise for a police officer that no arrest is made without a reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation as to the genuineness of the allegation. Despite this legal position, the Legislature did not find any improvement. Numbers of arrest have not decreased. Ultimately, the Parliament had to intervene and on the recommendation of the 177th Report of the Law Commission submitted in the year 2001, Section
41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr.PC), in the present form came to be enacted. It is interesting to note that such a recommendation was made by the Law Commission in its 152nd and 154th Report submitted as back in the year 1994. The value of the proportionality permeates the amendment relating to arrest. As the offence with which we
are concerned in the present appeal, provides for a maximum punishment of imprisonment which may extend to seven years and fine, Section 41(1)(b), Cr.PC which is relevant for the purpose reads as follows:
“41. When police may arrest without warrant.-(1) Any police officer may
without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest any person
(a)x x x x x x
(b)against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible
information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has
committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term
which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years
whether with or without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied,
(i) x x x x x
(ii) the police officer is satisfied that such arrest is necessary –
to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or
for proper investigation of the offence; or
to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to
disappear or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or
to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any
person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from
disclosing such facts to the Court or to the police officer; or
as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever
required cannot be ensured,
and the police officer shall record while making such arrest, his reasons
Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a
person is not required under the provisions of this sub-section, record the
reasons in writing for not making the arrest.
X x x x x x
From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that a
person accused of offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years with or without
fine, cannot be arrested by the police officer only on its satisfaction
that such person had committed the offence punishable as aforesaid. Police
officer before arrest, in such cases has to be further satisfied that such
arrest is necessary to prevent such person from committing any further
offence; or for proper investigation of the case; or to prevent the accused
from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear; or tampering with
such evidence in any manner; or to prevent such person from making any
inducement, threat or promise to a witness so as to dissuade him from
disclosing such facts to the Court or the police officer; or unless such
accused person is arrested, his presence in the court whenever required
cannot be ensured. These are the conclusions, which one may reach based on
facts. Law mandates the police officer to state the facts and record the
reasons in writing which led him to come to a conclusion covered by any of
the provisions aforesaid, while making such arrest. Law further requires
the police officers to record the reasons in writing for not making the
arrest. In pith and core, the police office before arrest must put a
question to himself, why arrest? Is it really required? What purpose it
will serve? What object it will achieve? It is only after these questions
are addressed and one or the other conditions as enumerated above is
satisfied, the power of arrest needs to be exercised. In fine, before
arrest first the police officers should have reason to believe on the basis
of information and material that the accused has committed the offence.
Apart from this, the police officer has to be satisfied further that the
arrest is necessary for one or the more purposes envisaged by sub-clauses
(a) to (e) of clause (1) of Section 41 of Cr.PC.
An accused arrested without warrant by the police has the
constitutional right under Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India and
Section 57, Cr.PC to be produced before the Magistrate without unnecessary
delay and in no circumstances beyond 24 hours excluding the time necessary
for the journey. During the course of investigation of a case, an accused
can be kept in detention beyond a period of 24 hours only when it is
authorised by the Magistrate in exercise of power under Section 167 Cr.PC.
The power to authorise detention is a very solemn function. It affects the
liberty and freedom of citizens and needs to be exercised with great care
and caution. Our experience tells us that it is not exercised with the
seriousness it deserves. In many of the cases, detention is authorised in a
routine, casual and cavalier manner. Before a Magistrate authorises
detention under Section 167, Cr.PC, he has to be first satisfied that the
arrest made is legal and in accordance with law and all the constitutional
rights of the person arrested is satisfied. If the arrest effected by the
police officer does not satisfy the requirements of Section 41 of the Code,
Magistrate is duty bound not to authorise his further detention and release
the accused. In other words, when an accused is produced before the
Magistrate, the police officer effecting the arrest is required to furnish
to the Magistrate, the facts, reasons and its conclusions for arrest and
the Magistrate in turn is to be satisfied that condition precedent for
arrest under Section 41 Cr.PC has been satisfied and it is only thereafter
that he will authorise the detention of an accused. The Magistrate before
authorising detention will record its own satisfaction, may be in brief but
the said satisfaction must reflect from its order. It shall never be
based upon the ipse dixit of the police officer, for example, in case the
police officer considers the arrest necessary to prevent such person from
committing any further offence or for proper investigation of the case or
for preventing an accused from tampering with evidence or making inducement
etc., the police officer shall furnish to the Magistrate the facts, the
reasons and materials on the basis of which the police officer had reached
its conclusion. Those shall be perused by the Magistrate while authorising
the detention and only after recording its satisfaction in writing that the
Magistrate will authorise the detention of the accused. In fine, when a
suspect is arrested and produced before a Magistrate for authorising
detention, the Magistrate has to address the question whether specific
reasons have been recorded for arrest and if so, prima facie those reasons
are relevant and secondly a reasonable conclusion could at all be reached
by the police officer that one or the other conditions stated above are
attracted. To this limited extent the Magistrate will make judicial
Another provision i.e. Section 41A Cr.PC aimed to avoid
unnecessary arrest or threat of arrest looming large on accused requires to
be vitalised. Section 41A as inserted by Section 6 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008(Act 5 of 2009), which is relevant
in the context reads as follows:
“41A. Notice of appearance before police officer.-(1) The police officer
shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the
provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 41, issue a notice directing the
person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible
information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has
committed a cognizable offence, to appear before him or at such other place
as may be specified in the notice.
(2) Where such a notice is issued to any person, it shall be the duty of
that person to comply with the terms of the notice.
(3) Where such person complies and continues to comply with the notice, he
shall not be arrested in respect of the offence referred to in the notice
unless, for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion
that he ought to be arrested.
(4) Where such person, at any time, fails to comply with the terms of the
notice or is unwilling to identify himself, the police officer may, subject
to such orders as may have been passed by a competent Court in this behalf,
arrest him for the offence mentioned in the notice.”
Aforesaid provision makes it clear that in all cases where the
arrest of a person is not required under Section 41(1), Cr.PC, the police
officer is required to issue notice directing the accused to appear before
him at a specified place and time. Law obliges such an accused to appear
before the police officer and it further mandates that if such an accused
complies with the terms of notice he shall not be arrested, unless for
reasons to be recorded, the police office is of the opinion that the arrest
is necessary. At this stage also, the condition precedent for arrest as
envisaged under Section 41 Cr.PC has to be complied and shall be subject to
the same scrutiny by the Magistrate as aforesaid.
We are of the opinion that if the provisions of Section 41,
Cr.PC which authorises the police officer to arrest an accused without an
order from a Magistrate and without a warrant are scrupulously enforced,
the wrong committed by the police officers intentionally or unwittingly
would be reversed and the number of cases which come to the Court for grant
of anticipatory bail will substantially reduce. We would like to emphasise
that the practice of mechanically reproducing in the case diary all or most
of the reasons contained in Section 41 Cr.PC for effecting arrest be
discouraged and discontinued.
Our endeavour in this judgment is to ensure that police officers do not
arrest accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorise detention
casually and mechanically. In order to ensure what we have observed above,
we give the following direction:
All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to
automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A of the IPC is
registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under
the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41, Cr.PC;
All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub-
clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);
The police officer shall forward the check list duly filed and furnish the
reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest, while
forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further
The Magistrate while authorising detention of the accused shall peruse the
report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after
recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorise detention;
The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate
within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy
to the Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of police of
the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41A of Cr.PC be served on the
accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which
may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the District for the
reasons to be recorded in writing;
Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering
the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall
also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before
High Court having territorial jurisdiction.
Authorising detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the
judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by
the appropriate High Court.
We hasten to add that the directions aforesaid shall not only apply to the
cases under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. or Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, the case in hand, but also such cases where offence is
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years
or which may extend to seven years; whether with or without fine.
We direct that a copy of this judgment be forwarded to the Chief
Secretaries as also the Director Generals of Police of all the State
Governments and the Union Territories and the Registrar General of all the
High Courts for onward transmission and ensuring its compliance.
By order dated 31st of October, 2013, this Court had granted
provisional bail to the appellant on certain conditions. We make this order
In the result, we allow this appeal, making our aforesaid order dated 31st
October, 2013 absolute; with the directions aforesaid.
(CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
(PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE)
July 2, 2014.
Bombay HC- Possibility of false implication by Wife cannot be ruled out, hence Anticipatory Bail Granted.
Another order from Justice. M. L. Tahilyani on false case by wife….
“I have gone through the First Information Report and police papers, particularly the spot panchanama. Spot panchanama does not indicate that the signs of kerosene were found on the spot. Nothing incriminating was seized from the spot by the police. This indicates that probably no such incident had occurred.
5. I have also gone through the Medical Report. The Medical Officer has not stated that the clothes of the complainant were smelling kerosene when she was examined. There was no serious injury on her body. Possibility of false
implication cannot be ruled out.””
Continue to read full order
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, AT NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL APPLICATION (ABA) NO.269 OF 2014
(Charansingh Jaising Rathod and others ..vs.. The State of Maharashtra, through PSO, PS Digras,
Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram,
Court’s or Judge’s orders appearances, Court’s orders of directions and Registrar’s orders
Shri J.B. Kasat, Advocate for the applicants,
Mrs. Rashi Deshpande, Addl.P.P. for the nonapplicant/State.
CORAM : M.L.TAHALIYANI, J.
DATED : 16062014
Heard learned Counsel Shri J.B. Kasat for the applicants and learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mrs.
Rashi Deshpande for the nonapplicant/State.
2. The complainant was married to one Manik Charansingh Rathod on 11122013. It was intercaste marriage. It appears that the family members of Manik were against the marriage. It further appears that there was a
dispute in the family and therefore, a criminal case for the offence punishable under Section 498A read with Section 34
of the Indian Penal Code was lodged by the complainant. Thereafter the complainant was staying on rent in the house
of Shri Shahade at Yavatmal along with her mother.
3. The incident had occurred on 0552014. The complainant was going to the house of Postman at the time of incident. It is alleged that the applicants had poured kerosene on her while she was proceeding to the house of postman. She had lodged report at Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 285 and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. It appears that later on Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code has also been added.
4. I have gone through the First Information Report and police papers, particularly the spot panchanama. Spot panchanama does not indicate that the signs of kerosene were found on the spot. Nothing incriminating was seized from the
spot by the police. This indicates that probably no such incident had occurred.
5. I have also gone through the Medical Report. The Medical Officer has not stated that the clothes of the complainant were smelling kerosene when she was examined. There was no serious injury on her body. Possibility of false
implication cannot be ruled out. Hence, I pass the following order.
The applicants be released on bail in the sum of Rs.10,000/ (rupees ten thousand) each with one solvent surety in the like amount for each of them, in the event of their arrest in First Information Report No. of 156/2014 of
Digras Police Station, District Yavatmal, for the offences punishable under Section 285, 323, 354A and 307 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
The applicants shall attend the office of the Investigating Officer as and when required by the Investigating Officer till the investigation is completed.
The application stands disposed of accordingly.
Bombay HC- If there is no Domestic Violence on Woman then the children are not entitle for relief u/s. 20 of PWDVA 2005.
“the monetary relief is available for the children of the aggrieved person if the monetary relief is required to meet the
expenses incurred by the aggrieved person as a result of domestic violence. The monetary relief is also permissible in case losses are suffered by the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence. The monetary relief is available to children of the aggrieved person under Section 20 of the Act. However, the aggrieved person is under obligation to establish that she had to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered due to domestic violence on the part of the respondent. In the present case, since the learned Magistrate has come to a conclusion that the domestic violence could not be proved and since that finding of the learned Magistrate has not been challenged by the aggrieved person, it follows that no relief could have been given to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 also.
Bombay High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 32 OF 2014
Koushik S/o. Anil Gharami,
Aged about 40 years,
R/o House NO.59, Shayamapalli
Khajurikala, Piplani, Bhopal462022
Tahsil Hujur and District : Bhopal(MP) …. PETITIONER.
// VERSUS //
1. Sau. Sangeeta Koushik Gharami,
aged about 36, Occu. Service,
2. Ku. Gayatri Sangeeta Gharami,
3. Ku. Astha Sangeeta Gharami,
Age about 6 years,
Respondent No.2 and 3 being minors are
represented by their adlitum mother the
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 all are R/o. C/o.
Thakurdas Mahaldar, Post : Alapalli,
Tahsil : Aheri, District : Gadchiroli.
Mrs. Sonali Saware, Advocate with Petitioner.
Mr. C.M.Munje,Advocate with the respondent No.1.
CORAM : M.L. TAHALIYANI, J.
DATED : MAY 05, 2014.
ORAL JUDGMENT :
2. ADMIT. Heard finally by consent of the parties.
3. A short question that arises for determination in present writ petition is, as to whether the minor children of the aggrieved person are entitled for maintenance under Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 if the trial Magistrate has come to a conclusion that the domestic violence has not been proved.
4. Admittedly, the petitioner is husband of respondent No.1 and father of respondent Nos.2 and 3. Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 filed an application under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Aheri. The said application was heard on merits and following points were framed by the Magistrate for determination:
1. Does Applicant No.1 prove that she was subjected to Domestic
Violence by Nonapplicant No.1 as alleged in the application ?
2. Do the applicants are entitled for relief claimed in their claim
3. What order ?
The learned Magistrate had answered point No.1 in negative and point No.2 was answered partly in affirmative. The learned Magistrate had come to a conclusion that respondent No.1 had not been able to establish that she was subject to domestic violence by the petitioner. The learned Magistrate has also come to a conclusion that respondent No.1 was not entitled for any monetary relief. However, monetary relief was granted to respondent Nos. 2 and 3. The final order of the learned Magistrate runs as
“1. The application is partly allowed.
2. NonApplicant No.1 shall pay Rs.2000/ per
month to Applicant No.2 and 3 each, for their
education, from the date of application.
3. NonApplicant No.1 shall pay Rs.1000/ per
month to applicant no.2 and 3 each, for their
maintenance (monitory relief) from the date of
4. parties to bear their own cost.
5. The amount received by Applicant No. 2 and 3
under interim order, Exh.No.18, be set off against
the amount as mentioned above.”
5. The petitioner had filed a criminal appeal against the said order of the learned Magistrate. The said Criminal Appeal was also dismissed on 9th December, 2013.
6. As already stated, the question that arises, whether respondent Nos.2 and 3 could be granted any monetary relief despite the fact that domestic violence could not be proved by respondent No.1. In this regard, one will have to refer to certain provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. ‘Aggrieved Person’ has been defined in Section 2(a) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 :
“2(a) “aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent
and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent;”
7. Chapter IV deals with ‘Procedure for obtaining orders of reliefs’.
Section 12 lays down the procedure for presenting application before the
concerned Magistrate. Sections 18 and 19 of the Act deal with ‘Protection
Orders’ and ‘Residence Orders’, respectively. Section 20 deals with
8. In the present petition, this Court is concerned as to whether any monetary relief could have been given to respondent Nos. 2 & 3. Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
lays down :
“20. Monetary reliefs. (1) While disposing of an
application under subsection (1) of Section 12, the
Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary
relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered
by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved
person as a result of the domestic violence and such relief
may include, but is not limited to
(a) the loss of earnings;
(b) the medical expenses;
(c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or
removal of any property from the control of the
aggrieved person; and
(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as
her children, if any, including an order under or in
addition to an order of maintenance under section 125
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974) or
any other law for the time being in force.”
9. It is thus, clear that the monetary relief is available for the children of the aggrieved person if the monetary relief is required to meet the expenses incurred by the aggrieved person as a result of domestic violence. The monetary relief is also permissible in case losses are suffered by the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence. The monetary relief is available to children of the aggrieved person under Section 20 of the Act. However, the aggrieved person is under obligation to establish that she had to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered due to domestic violence on the part of the respondent. In the present case, since the learned Magistrate has come to a conclusion that the domestic violence could not be
proved and since that finding of the learned Magistrate has not been challenged by the aggrieved person, it follows that no relief could have been given to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 also.
10. In my considered opinion, the learned Magistrate had committed an error in granting monetary relief to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 despite the fact that domestic violence could not be established. Though it is possible to say that the maintenance was permissible for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 (minor children) under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the monetary reliefs could not have been given to them under Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The view taken by the learned Magistrate and the appellate Court, in my opinion, is not correct and hence, I pass the following order.
i. The writ petition is allowed.
ii. The order passed by learned Magistrate in Misc. Criminal Case No. 27 of 2011 on 12th March, 2013 and the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Gadchiroli in Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2013 on 9th
December, 2013 are set aside.
iii. The amount of Rs.Twenty Five Thousand, deposited by the petitioner in this Court shall be refunded to him immediately.
The petition stands disposed of accordingly.
Bombay HC- CrPC 125(3) procedure to be followed for recovery of due amount/ arrears in PWDVA 2005 instead of issuing Non Bailable order Directly.
“the procedure laid down under Section 125(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for getting compliance of the orders passed by the Magistrate under Section 125(1) of the Code will have to be followed for executing the orders passed by the Magistrate under Section 20 (Monetary Reliefs) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The reliefs available under Section 125(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure are analogous to the reliefs available under
Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. “
Bombay High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.305 OF 2014.
Mr. Sachin s/o Suresh Bodhale,
Aged 36 years,
Occupation – Business,
R/o Plot No.2, Apana Ghar Scheme,
Visava Naka, Godoli, Satara (MH). …. PETITIONER
Sau. Sushma w/o Sachin Bodhale,
Aged 35 years,
Occupation – Nil,
R/o C/o Sau. Savita Sanjay Patil,
Plot No.119, Shri Mahalaxmi Apartment,
Nelco Housing Society, Subhash Nagar,
Nagpur. …. RESPONDENT
Shri Sudhir Moharir, Advocate for the petitioner,
Shri R.R. Vyas, Advocate for the respondent.
CORAM : M.L. TAHALIYANI, J.
DATED : 6th
ORAL JUDGMENT :
1. Heard learned Counsel Shri Sudhir Moharir for the petitioner and learned Counsel Shri R.R. Vyas for the respondent.
2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith by the consent of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties.
3. The petitioner has moved this Court by invoking powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Magistrate in Misc. Criminal Application No.890/2012
(Sushma vs. Sachin). The order, which is questioned before this Court, reads as under :
“Perused the application and stay.
Heard learned Advocate for both sides.
Applicant relied on 2013 All M.R.(Cri.) 2572. Learned
Advocate for N.A. has opposed that Magistrate has no powers.
N.A. has not paid any amount towards interim maintenance.
Learned Advocate has also confessed that N.A. has not paid any
amount towards interim maintenance order which is passed on
Provision under Section 28(2) is very clear when N.A. has
not paid amount and not complied the order, she cannot be kept
high and dray. Magistrate is empowered under Section 28(2) to
issue N.B.W. Citation filed by applicant is very much applicable
in the case in hand. Hence application is allowed. Issue N.B.W.
4. The petitioner is husband of the respondent. The respondent has filed an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 before the learned Magistrate. An interim order has been passed granting monetary relief. It appears that the petitioner has not paid the amount to the respondent as per the interim order. A
nonbailable warrant has been issued for nonpayment of amount of interim maintenance to the respondent by the petitioner. It appears from the order of the learned Magistrate that the learned Magistrate was of the view that he could formulate his own procedure under Section 28(2) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. It appears that the Magistrate was also of the view that he can lay down his own procedure for recovery of the amount of interim maintenance. Subsection (2) of Section 28 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 reads as under :
“28(2). Nothing in subsection (1) shall prevent the court from laying down its own procedure for disposal of an
application under section 12 or under subsection (2) of section 23.
Subsection(1) of Section 28 of the said Act reads as under :“28(1). Save as otherwise provided in this Act, all proceedings under sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under section 31 shall be governed by the provisions
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)”
5. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that basically the learned Magistrate has to follow the procedure laid down in the Code of CriminalProcedure for recovery of maintenance either final or interim. Subsection (2) of Section 28 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 can be pressed into service when there is no provision available for implementing a particular order passed under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. If the procedure is available in Code of Criminal Procedure, that is necessarily to be followed.
6. In my considered opinion, the procedure laid down under Section 125(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for getting compliance of the orders passed by the Magistrate under Section 125(1) of the Code will have to be followed for executing the orders passed by the Magistrate under Section 20 (Monetary Reliefs) of the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005. The reliefs available under Section 125(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure are analogous to the reliefs available under Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
The procedure for getting compliance of the order passed under Section 125(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is available under Section 125(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which runs as under :
“125(3). If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for
every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month’s (allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be,) remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made:
Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made
to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due: Provided further that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this Section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing.”
7. The procedure for levying of fines is available under Section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as under :
“421. Warrant for levy of fine – When an offender has been
sentenced to pay a fine, the Court passing the sentence may take
action for the recovery of the fine in either or both of the
following ways, that is to say, it may
(a) issue a warrant for the levy of the amount by
attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to the
(b) issue a warrant to the Collector of the district,
authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue
from the movable or immovable property, or both of the
8. Thus there is absolutely clear provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which lays down as to how the amount of maintenance, final or interim, is to be recovered. The Magistrate, in my opinion, could not have issued nonbailable warrant directly. He should have followed the procedure laid down in sub section (3) of Section 125 & Section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure, in the first place, the Magistrate was under obligation to issue a warrant for levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any movable property. The other remedy available was to issue a warrant to the Collector of the district, authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both of the defaulter. The Magistrate could have sentenced the petitioner for the whole or any part of each month’s allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which might extend to one month or until payment if sooner made.
9. As such the first option available to the Magistrate was to issue a warrant for levying fine. If whole of the amount was recovered by adopting the procedure under Section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the question of putting the defaulter in prison did not arise. In case amount was not recovered or part of it was recovered and part of it was not recovered, then the question would have arisen as to how much sentence should be imposed on the defaulter as per the provision laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The stage of issuing warrant comes only after sentencing and not before that.
10. In view of above discussion, it is abundantly clear that the order dated 024 2014 passed by the learned Magistrate in Misc. Criminal Application No.890/2012 cannot be sustained. It needs to be quashed and is
accordingly quashed. The respondent is at liberty to take necessary steps in accordance with law.
11. Rule is made absolute in the above terms.