IPC 498a Quashed-No Territorial Jurisdiction

Jharkhand High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

Cr.M.P.No.621 of 2007

Md. Naushad Alam. Petitioner

-Versus-

1. The State of Jharkhand.

2. Shabina Begum. Opp. Parties

————-

CORAM: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE D.K.SINHA

For the petitioner: Mr. Jitendra Nath & Sandhya Sahay, Advocates.

For the State: A.P.P.

For the O.P.No.2: Mr. Arvind Kumar Choudhary, Advocate. ————-

C.A.V. on 25.03.2011 : Pronounced on 25.04.2011 ————-

D.K.Sinha,J. The petitioner has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure for the quashment of the order dated 22.03.2007 passed by the S.D.J.M., Madhupur at Deoghar in P.C.R. No. 399 of 2006 by which cognizance of the offence was taken against him under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.

2. The prosecution story in short was that the complainant-O.P.No.2 claimed to be the wife of petitioner-Naushad Alam, pursuant to a “Nikah” which was performed on 23.04.2002 and after consummation of their marriage two children were born to them, one of them was son and another was daughter. For the last three years, the Complainant O.P.No.2 alleged that the petitioner husband demanded Hero Honda motorcycle to be brought from her parental home and in this connection he subjected her to mental and physical cruelty. The matter was informed to her father, who came to the house of the petitioner who tried to pacify the matter and requested him to keep and maintain his daughter peacefully and then he returned back. The accused then became more violent after the return of the father on the complainant as a result of which she fell ill and no treatment was extended. Her father came and provided medical aid. It was alleged that on 17.06.2006 all the accused persons retained all her jewelleries and the husband petitioner Md. Naushad Alam took her to Madhupur with her two children and left all of them at the Madhupur Railway Station uncared with the caution that she would be killed if she would return without fulfilling his demand. All pursuasion made by her father failed for “Rukshadi” of his daughter to her matrimonial home and then he wrote letters to the Secretary, President and other Members of Anjuman Committee, Sitala narrating the miseries of his daughter but of no avail. However, it was alleged that on the given date and time of occurrence the accused persons came to the parental home of the complainant at Panhaiyatola and threatened in clear words that the complainant would be accepted only on fulfillment of their demand and returned back. It was further alleged that the petitioner husband extended threat that the complainant and his father would be implicated in false cases by registering it in different States.

2 Lastly on 25.09.2006 the complainant went to the Police Station to lodge a case which was not accepted and only then the complaint case for the alleged offence under Sections 323/379/498A/406 of the Indian Penal Code against three named accused persons but the cognizance of the offence was taken only against the petitioner husband Md. Naushad Alam for the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.

3. Learned Counsel Mr. Jitendra Nath assailed the impugned order by which cognizance of the offence was taken under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code against the husband-petitioner on the sole ground that no part of the alleged occurrence took place within the territorial jurisdiction of S.D.J.M., Madhupur at Deoghar and therefore, the cognizance of the offence was barred by territorial jurisdiction under Section 177 Code of Criminal Procedure as the S.D.J.M., Madhupur at Deoghar was not within his competence to do so. As a matter of fact, the occurrence did not take place in the manner presented by the complainant rather the petitioner-husband consistently visited her parental home to take her back to his home and on 25.06.2006 he was not allowed even to meet his wife and was asked to come along with 5 other persons for her “Rukshadi”, the learned Counsel added. The petitioner-husband was apprehensive that he might be implicated in any false case, he, as such, filed an Informatory Petition in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Giridih vide Misc. Application No.1897 of 2006 on 05.09.2006 stating all the relevant facts and informed the C.J.M., Giridih that there was chance of his false implication in any criminal case at the instance of his wife Sabina Begam and her father and requested to keep the informatory in the record for future use.

4. Learned Counsel further submitted that the petitioners sent a legal notice (Annexure-2) to his father-in-law Md. Fariuddin asking him to send his wife Sabina Begam and children failing to which it was cautioned that legal action would be taken. The petitioner-husband then filed a Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 163 of 2006 before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Giridih under Section 281 of the Mohammadan law for restitution of conjugal rights which was admitted and notice was issued to the complainant-wife. The other allegations for the offence under Sections 379/323 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code were disbelieved by the learned S.D.J.M., Madhupur at Deoghar and the cognizance of the offence was taken only under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code against the husband and other two accused were exonerated, in that manner, the major part of the allegations was disbelieved by the S.D.J.M.

5. On the point of territorial jurisdiction of the Court under Section 177 Cr.P.C. the learned Counsel submitted that the complainant-O.P.No.2 admitted in her statements recorded on solemn affirmation that her husband was living mostly at Patna by doing preparations for competitive examination and during their stay together for 5 years after the marriage, no complaint was made or  cruelty was ever extended but it was raised only when she was taken away by her father on his instigation. It would be evident from the Complaint Petition that the entire occurrence took place at her Matrimonial Home at village Sitala P.S. Gande within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of Giridih but the complaint was filed before the S.D.J.M., Madupur at Deoghar, who had no jurisdiction to take cognizance.

6. Finally, the learned Counsel submitted that it would be relevant that in her statements recorded on solemn affirmation on 26.09.2006 she admitted that the entire allegation of torture or demand of dowry in kind of motorcycle took place at her Matrimonial Home and further admitted that her husband/petitioner took her to Madhupur in the month of June, 2006 but without any overtact. No part of cruelty in terms of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code was extended to the complainant by the husband-petitioner so as to bring the case within the territorial jurisdiction of Madhupur Court within the district of Deoghar.

7. Learned Counsel Mr. Arvind Kumar Choudhary appearing for the O.P.No.2 submitted that the complainant in her Complaint Petition as contained in paragraph no.9 clearly stated that all the accused persons including the petitioner came to her father’s house at Panhaiyakola, Madhupur and warned in clear words that they would accept the complainant only when their demand would be fulfilled and then they left the place and therefore, the part of the occurrence took place at Panhaiyakola within the jurisdiction of Madhupur Court.

8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, argument advanced on behalf of the parties, I find that the facts contained in paragraph no.9 of the complaint case whereby it was shown that the part of the occurrence took place at Panhaikola when the accused persons went there and warned the complainant and father, as referred to hereinbefore could not be substantiated in the statements of the complainant on her solemn affirmation, recorded by the S.D.J.M. The complicity of the other accused persons for the alleged offence was disbelieved by the Court after enquiry and the cognizance of the offence as such under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code was taken only against the husband petitioner. I find that the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant-O.P.No.2 failed to show that any part of the alleged occurrence for the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code was committed by the petitioner within the territorial jurisdiction of Madhupur Court and therefore, the impugned order by which cognizance was taken by the S.D.J.M., Madhupur was barred by jurisdiction as the Court was not within his competence to take cognizance of the offence which took place outside within the district of Giridih where the matrimonial home of the complainant was situated.

9. In Bhura Ram and Ors. Vrs. State of Rajasthan & Anr, reported in 2008 (3) JLJR S.C. 287, the Apex Court held,

“The facts stated in the complaint disclose that the complainant left the place where she was residing with her husband and in-laws and came to the city of Sri Ganganagar, State of Rajasthan and that all the alleged acts as per the complaint had taken place in the State of Punjab. The Court at Rajasthan does not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. On the basis of the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Rajasthan and, therefore, the Magistrate concerned has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. As a consequence thereof, the proceedings before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar are quashed. The complaint be returned to the complainant and if she so wishes she may file the same in the appropriate court to be dealt with in accordance with law.”

10. In the facts and circumstances, relying upon the proposition of law referred to here-in-before I find it to be a fit case for invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court for quashment of the order impugned by which cognizance of the offence was taken by the S.D.J.M., Madhupur at Deoghar as the same is barred by territorial jurisdiction. Accordingly, the cognizance of the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner is quashed. The complaint is directed to be returned to the Complainant O.P.No.2 with the liberty to file a fresh complaint if she so liked before the appropriate Court to be dealt with in accordance with law.

11. With this observation, this petition is allowed.

[D.K.Sinha,J.]

P.K.S./A.F.R.

Supreme Court-IPC 498A Quashed-Territorial Jurisdiction

Bhura Ram v. State of Rajasthan

(P.P. Naolekar & V.S. Sirpurkar, JJ.)

Bhura Ram and Ors. —————- Petitioner(s)

v.

State of Rajasthan & Anr. ———— Respondent(s)

Criminal Appeal No. 587 of 2008, decided on April 2, 2008

NON-REPORTABLE

[arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 79 of 2006)

The judgement of the Court was delivered by

P.P. Naolekar, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The complainant Rajeshwari lodged a complaint on 4.9.2001 before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,Sri Ganganagar against the appellants. The complaint under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was sent to the Police Station, Sadar Sri Ganganagar for investigation on which FIR No. 246 of 2001 was registered against the appellants for offences under Sections 498A, 406 and 147 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Challan was filed against the appellants in the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganga Nagar. The charges were framed against the appellants for offences under Sections 498A and 406 IPC. The appellants made a prayer before the Court that the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the offences as the cause of action accrued within the jurisdiction of the other court. The application was rejected. The Revision Petition before the learned Sessions

Judge, Sri Ganganagar was also rejected. The High Court dismissed the S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition preferred by the appellants holding that although the marriage was solemnized at Village Ramsara, Tehsil Abohar, District Ferozpur, and right from the marriage, the complainant and her husband Ravindra Kumar were living in Punjab with her in-laws and her husband had died, and that she is now residing in Sri Ganganagar District in Rajasthan along with her maternal relations, but still offence under Section 498A IPC, being a continuing one, the complaint cannot be dismissed

on the ground that it was time barred; and that the offence of cruelty being a continuing offence is still continuing with the local area of Rajasthan, where at present the complainant is living and, therefore, the Additional Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar had jurisdiction to try the case. The Court has found that all the allegations regarding the offences charged with have been committed at the previous residence of the complainant.

3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the question involved is squarely covered by the decision

of this Court in Y. Abraham Ajith and Others vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another, (2004) 8 SCC 100, wherein

this Court has held that cause of action having arisen within the jurisdiction of the court where the offence was

committed, could not be tried by the court where no part of offence was committed.

4. The facts stated in the complaint disclose that the complainant left the place where she was residing with her husband and in-laws and came to the city of Sri Ganganagar, State of Rajasthan and that all the alleged acts as per the complaint had taken place in the State of Punjab. The Court at Rajasthan does not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. On the basis of the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Rajasthan and, therefore, the Magistrate concerned has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

As a consequence thereof, the proceedings before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar are quashed. The complaint be returned to the complainant and if she so wishes she may file the same in the appropriate court to be dealt with in accordance with law.

5. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

Ranchi HC-IPC 498A Quashed-Territorial Jurisdiction

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

Cr. M. P. No.223 of 2007

Sraban Kumar Agarwala & Ors. ……Petitioners.

-VersusThe State of Jharkhand & Anr. ..…..Opposite Parties.

——

CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NARENDRA NATH TIWARI

——

For the Petitioners : Mr. T. R. Bajaj, Sr. Advocate.

For the State : A.P.P.

For O.P. No.2 : Mr. R. S. Mazumdar, Advocate.

——

11/12.08.2009:

1. In this petition, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the order dated 22^nd May, 2006 passed by learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Rajmahal, Sahibganj in P.C.R. Case no.127 of 2006, whereby cognizance of the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code has been taken against the petitioners.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioners assailed the impugned order on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction of the court below. It has been submitted that from the plain reading of the complaint petition it is evident that the entire allegations are related to the place at Murshidabad in the State of West Bengal.  There is no allegation of commission of any act within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned court below. It has been submitted that in the case of Bhura Ram & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., reported in AIR 2008 SC 2666, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in a complaint under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code if the alleged acts were of the place falling within another State, a complaint cannot be entertained in the court of another State. In the said case, the complaint was related to the place, falling within the State of Punjab, while the complaint case under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code was filed in the State of Rajasthan. The Supreme Court has held that since no cause of action arose in the State of Rajasthan, the Court of that State had no jurisdiction to deal with the said case.

3. Mr. T. R. Bajaj, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf  of the petitioners, submitted that in the instant case, all the  alleged acts are of the place at Murshidabad in the State of  West Bengal and there is no allegation of commission of any act  or any act, constituting   offence   under   Section   498A  of the Indian  Penal  Code,  at the place within State of Jharkhand and as such learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Rajmahal, Sahibganj has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence  under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code against the  petitioners. The impugned order is, thus, without jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed.

4. Mr. R. S. Mazumdar, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the complainant-Opposite Party no.2, has not disputed the said legal position. He has fairly accepted that the case is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhura Ram & Ors. (Supra), as the allegations do not show any cause of action arising in the State of Jharkhand.

5. In view of the above admitted legal and factual position, this petition is allowed. The order taking cognizance dated 22^nd May, 2006 passed by learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Rajmahal, Sahibganj in P.C.R. Case no.127 of 2006 is quashed.

6. It is made clear that this order shall not in any way impede the complainant-Opposite Party no.2 to file any such complaint in the court of competent jurisdiction.

(Narendra Nath Tiwari, J.)

Supreme Court-IPC 498A/406 Quashed-No cause of action in Chennai

Supreme Court of India

Bench: A Pasayat, C Thakker

CASE NO.:

Appeal (crl.) 904 of 2004

PETITIONER:

Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors.

RESPONDENT:

Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/08/2004

BENCH:

ARIJIT PASAYAT & C.K. THAKKER

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No. 4573/2003)

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

Leave granted.

Appellants call in question legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court whereby the appellants’ prayer for quashing proceedings in CC 3532 of 2001 on the file of the Court of XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate Saidapet, Chennai, by exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ‘Code’) was rejected. Background facts sans unnecessary details are as follows :

Respondent no.2 as complainant filed complaint in the Court of the concerned magistrate alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ‘IPC’) and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 ( in short the ‘Dowry Act’). The magistrate directed the police to investigate and after investigation charge-sheet was filed by the police. When the matter stood thus, the appellants filed an application under Section 482 of the Code before the High Court alleging that the concerned magistrate has no jurisdiction even to entertain the complaint even if the allegations contained therein are accepted in toto. According to them, no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. The complaint itself disclosed that after 15.4.1997, the respondent left Nagercoil and came to Chennai and was staying there. All the allegations which are per se without any basis took place according to the complainant at Nagercoil, and therefore, the Courts at Chennai did not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. It was further submitted that earlier a complaint was lodged by the complainant before the concerned police officials having jurisdiction; but after inquiry no action was deemed necessary.

In response, learned counsel submitted that some of the offences were continuing offences. The appellant no.1 had initiated proceedings for judicial separation, the notice for which was received by her at Chennai and, therefore, the cause of action existed.

The High Court unfortunately did not consider rival stands and even did not record any finding on the question of law raised regarding lack of jurisdiction. It felt that legal parameters were to be considered after a thorough trial after due opportunity to the parties and, therefore, the factual points raised by parties were not to be adjudicated under Section 484 of the Code.

In support of the appeal Mr. T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, learned senior counsel, submitted that the approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous. A bare reading of the complaint would go to show that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Court where the complaint was filed. Therefore, the entire proceedings had no foundation.

In response, learned counsel for respondent no.2-complainant submitted that the offences were continuing in terms of Section 178(c) of the Code, and therefore The Court had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

Section 177 of the Code deals with the ordinary place of inquiry and trial, and reads as follows:

“Section 177 : ORDINARY PLACE OF INQUIRY

AND TRIAL:

Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.”

Sections 177 to 186 deal with venue and place of trial. Section 177 reiterates the well-established common law rule referred to in Halsbury’s Laws of England (Vol. IX para 83) that the proper and ordinary venue for the trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in which, on the evidence, the facts occur and which alleged to constitute the crime. There are several exceptions to this general rule and some of them are, so far as the present case is concerned, indicated in Section 178 of the Code which read as follows:

“Section 178 PLACE OF INQUIRY OR TRIAL

(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or

(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or

(c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in

different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.”

“All crime is local, the jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed”, as observed by Blackstone. A significant word used in Section 177 of the Code is “ordinarily”. Use of the word indicates that the provision is a general one and must be read subject to the special provisions contained in the Code. As observed by the Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1961 SC 1589), L.N.Mukherjee V. State of Madras (AIR 1961 SC 1601), Banwarilal Jhunjhunwalla and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (AIR 1963 SC 1620) andMohan Baitha and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. (2001 (4) SCC 350), exception implied by the word “ordinarily” need not be limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court. No such exception is applicable to the case at hand.

As observed by this Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Anr. (AIR 1973 SC 908), continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all, that it is one of those offences which arises out of the failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, liability continues till compliance, that on every occasion such disobedience or non-compliance occurs or recurs, there is the offence committed.

A similar plea relating to continuance of the offence was examined by this Court in Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee (1997 (5) SCC 30). There the allegations related to commission of alleged offences punishable under Section 498A, 506 and 323 IPC. On the factual background, it was noted that though the dowry demands were made earlier the husband of the complainant went to the place where complainant was residing and had assaulted her. This Court held in that factual background that clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the present case the factual position is different and the complainant herself left the house of the husband on 15.4.1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence much less at Chennai. That being so, the logic of Section 178 (c) of the Code relating to continuance of the offences cannot be applied.

The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. In terms of Section 177 of the Code it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused.

While in civil cases, normally the expression “cause of action” is used, in criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The expression “cause of action” is therefore not a stranger to criminal cases.

It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise.

The expression “cause of action” has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in “cause of action”.

The expression “cause of action” has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts.

The expression “cause of action” is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person. (Black’s Law Dictionary a “cause of action” is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In “Words and Phrases” (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the phrase “cause of action” in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf.

In Halsbury Laws of England (Fourth Edition) it has been stated as follows:

“Cause of action” has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. “Cause of action” has also been taken to mean that particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action”.

When the aforesaid legal principles are applied, to the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint petition, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Chennai and, therefore, the concerned magistrate had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The proceedings are quashed. The complaint be returned to respondent No.2 who, if she so chooses, may file the same in the appropriate Court to be dealt with in accordance with law. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

Madras HC: IPC 498A/406/DP4 Quashed -No Jurisdiction

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED : 20.08.2008

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.N. BASHA

Crl.O.P.No.18774 of 2005

& Crl.M.P.No.5527 of 2005

1. Balchand & Poonam Chand Chhaparwal

2. Chanda Devi Chhaparwal

3. Krishna Jhanwar

4. Gopal Chhaparwal .. Petitioners/Accused

Vs.

1. State rep. by

Inspector of Police,

All Women Police Station (C),

Coimbatore City. .. Respondent/Complainant

2. Kanchan @ Kanchan Devi .. Respondent

Impleaded as per the order of

this Court dated 3.2.2007 in

M.P.No.93 of 2007

* * *

Prayer : Criminal Original Petition filed under section 482 of Cr.P.C. to call for the records relating to C.C.No.1202 of 2005 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.III, Coimbatore, and quash the same. * * *

For Petitioners : Mr.S.Ashok Kumar, SC

for M/s.Giridhar Associates

For Respondent-1 : Mr.Babu Muthu Meeran

Additional Public Prosecutor

For Respondent-2 : Mr.M.Subramani

O R D E R

The petitioners have come forward with this petition seeking for the relief of quashing the proceedings initiated against them in C.C.No.1202 of 2005 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.III, Coimbatore, for the offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC and under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

2. Mr.S.Ashok Kumar, learned senior counsel for the petitioners mainly contended that the entire allegations contained in the complaint and other materials available on record clearly shows that the petitioners said to have committed the offences only at Burhanpur, Madhya Pradesh State and no cause of action arises within the State of Tamil Nadu and as such the learned Judicial Magistrate No.III, Coimbatore, ought not to have taken cognizance of the case and the entire proceedings is liable to be quashed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In support of his contention, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the following decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court : (1)Ramesh V. State of T.N. reported in (2005) 3 SCC 507 ; and

(2)Manish Ratan v. State of M.P. reported in (2007) 1 SCC 262 ;

3. Per contra, learned counsel for the defacto complainant, who has impleaded as second respondent, contended that a complaint was preferred before the Madhya Pradesh State police and on the basis of the compromise, action was dropped. It is further submitted that thereafter the second respondent/defacto complainant came back to her parental house and again the petitioners/accused said to have caused cruelty to the defacto complainant by contacting over the phone. It is submitted even assuming that the offence was alleged to have taken place at Madhya Pradesh the proceedings are not liable to be quashed and on the other hand, the case may be transferred to the competent Court at Madhya Pradesh. The learned counsel for the defacto complainant placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of M.P. V. Suresh Kaushal reported in (2003) 11 SCC 126 in support of his contention.

4. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor fairly submitted that as per the materials available on record the petitioners alleged to have committed the offences within the jurisdiction of Madhya Pradesh Court as the allegation levelled against the petitioners shows that the defacto complainant was subjected to cruelty while she was residing at Madhya Pradesh. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the defacto complainant is entitled to initiate proceedings before the concerned competent Court at Madhya Pradesh.

5. I have carefully considered the rival contentions put forward by either side and also perused the materials available on record including the complaint and the charge sheet and other statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.

6. The undisputed fact remains that the defacto complainant was residing along with her husband namely, the first accused at Burhanpur, Madhya Pradesh State and the perusal of the entire materials available on record clearly discloses that the defacto complainant, the second respondent was subjected to cruelty only while she was residing at Madhya Pradesh State. Therefore, it is crystal clear that only Madhya Pradesh Court is having jurisdiction to entertain the case.

7. The learned senior counsel rightly placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court inRamesh V. State of T.N. reported in (2005) 3 SCC 507. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held in that decision that, “10. The next controversy arising in the case is about the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court at Tiruchirapalli to try the cases. As already noted, the High Court was of the view that the questions raised in the petition cannot be decided before trial. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the issue relating to the place of trial can be decided even at this stage without going beyond the averments in the complaint filed by the respondents and the High Court should have, therefore, decided this point of jurisdiction, when it is raised before the trial has commenced. Our attention has been drawn to a recent decision of this Court in Y.Abraham Ajith V. Inspector of Police [(2004) SCC (Cri.) 2134]. In that case, the Madras High Court refused to interfere under Section 482 CrPC when the issue of territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned to take cognizance of the offence was raised. This Court did not endorse the approach of the High Court for not recording the finding on the question of jurisdiction. On reading the allegations in the complaint, the Court came to the conclusion that no part of the cause of action arose in Chennai and therefore the Metropolitan Magistrate at Chennai could not have taken cognizance and issued summons. On this ground, the criminal proceedings were quashed and the complaint was directed to be returned to the respondent who was given liberty to file the same in an appropriate court. That was also a case of complaint for an offence under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC filed by the wife against the appellant therein.

11. In the view we are taking, it is not necessary for us to delve into the question of territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Trichy in detail. Suffice it to say that on looking at the complaint as its face value, the offences alleged cannot be said to have been committed wholly or partly within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court at Trichy. Prima facie, none of the ingredients constituting the offence can be said to have occurred within the local jurisdiction of that court. Almost all the allegations pertain to acts of cruelty for the purpose of extracting additional property as dowry while she was in the matrimonial home at Mumbai and the alleged acts of misappropriation of her movable property at Mumbai. However, there is one allegation relevant to Section 498-A from which it could be inferred that one of the acts giving rise to the offence under the said section had taken place in Chennai. It is alleged that when the relations of the informant met her in-laws at a hotel in Chennai where they were staying on 13-10-1998, there was again a demand for dowry and a threat to torture her in case she was sent back to Mumbai without the money and articles demanded.

12. Thus the alleged acts which according to the petitioner constitute the offences under Sections 498-A and 406 were done by the accused mostly in Mumbai and partly in Chennai. Prima facie, there is nothing in the entire complaint which goes to show that any acts constituting the alleged offences were at all committed at Trichy.”

8. In the above said decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court ultimately transferred the case from Trichy to Chennai holding that part of cause of action arises at Chennai. In yet another decision as relied by the senior counsel for the petitioners in Manish Ratan v. State of M.P. reported in (2007) 1 SCC 262, the Hon’ble Apex Court has taken a similar view by placing reliance on the decision of Ramesh V. State of T.N. reported in (2005) 3 SCC 507, as cited supra.

9. In the decision relied by the learned counsel for the second respondent/defacto complainant inState of M.P. V. Suresh Kaushal reported in (2003) 11 SCC 126 also the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that once there is lack of jurisdiction for a particular Court to entertain or to take cognizance of a case, the said case is to be transferred to the concerned jurisdiction Court. It is to be seen that in the decision cited supra, the other competent jurisdiction Court comes well within the State of Madhya Pradesh.

10. In the instant case, as already pointed out, the entire cause of action arises only at the State of Madhya Pradesh and as such there is a total lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Court of Judicial Magistrate No.III, Coimbatore. It is pertinent to be noted that this Court while exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot transfer the instant case pending on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.III, Coimbatore, to the competent Court at Madhya Pradesh.

11. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Y.Abraham Ajith V. Inspector of Police reported in (2004) SCC (Cri.) 2134. In that decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held in paragraphs 12 & 13 as follows : “..

12.The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court concerned. In terms of section 177 of the Code, it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence, it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused. 13.While in civil cases, normally the expression “cause of action” is used, in criminal cases as stated in section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The expression “cause of action”, is therefore, not a stranger to criminal cases.”

12. The Hon’ble Apex Court has ultimately held in paragraph 19 as follows :

“…

19.When the aforesaid legal principles are applied, to the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint petition, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Chennai, and therefore, the Magistrate concerned had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The proceedings are quashed. The complaint be returned to respondent 2 who, is she so chooses, may file the same in the appropriate court to be dealt with in accordance with law.”

13. In yet another decision in Bhura Ram V. State of Rajasthan reported in 2008 AIR SCW 4449 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that, “4. The facts stated in the complaint disclose that the complainant left the place where she was residing with her husband and in-laws and came to the city of Sri Ganganagar, State of Rajasthan and that all the alleged acts as per the complaint had taken place in the State of Punjab. The Court at Rajasthan does not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. On the basis of the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Rajasthan and, therefore, the Magistrate concerned has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. As a consequence thereof, the proceedings before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar are quashed. The complaint be returned to the complainant and if she so wishes she may file the same in the appropriate court to be dealt with in accordance with law.”

14. The principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the decisions cited supra are squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case. As already pointed out that the entire cause of action arose only at the State of Madhya Pradesh and as such there is total lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Court of Judicial Magistrate No.III, Coimbatore. As such this Court is left with inevitable conclusion that the proceedings initiated against the petitioners is liable to be quashed and accordingly, the proceedings initiated against the petitioners in C.C.No.1202 of 2005 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.III, Coimbatore, is hereby quashed.

15. The learned Magistrate is directed to furnish certified copies of the relevant documents available on record including the statements of witnesses in the event of second respondent/defacto complainant filing such application for certified copies. It is made clear that the second respondent/defacto complainant is at liberty to prefer a complaint before the concerned jurisdiction police at Madhya Pradesh State, if he so desires.

16. This petition is ordered accordingly. Connected M.P. is closed.

CC

To

1. The Judicial Magistrate No.III,

Coimbatore.

2. The Inspector of Police,

All Women Police Station (C),

Coimbatore City.

3. The Public Prosecutor,

High Court,

Madras

SC-IPC 498A transferred from paternal house to matrimonial house

Supreme Court of India

Bench: S Sinha, Mark, E Katju

CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 210 of 2000

PETITIONER:  Manish Ratan & Ors.

RESPONDENT: State of M.P. & Anr.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/11/2006

BENCH:

S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

S.B. SINHA, J :

Application of Sections 177 and 178 of Code of Criminal Procedure (Code) is involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 1.09.1998 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Crl. Revision No. 98 of 1998.

Appellant No. 1 was married with Meena, Respondent No. 2 herein at Niwari, Distt. Tikangarh. They were living at their matrimonial home at Jabalpur. Allegedly, a complaint was lodged by father-in-law of Appellant No. 1 with the police station, Jabalpur on 19.04.1997 alleging that the appellants have been ill-treating his daughter and demanded dowry.

Meena allegedly lodged another First Information Report against the appellants at the Police Station, Datia on 25.05.1997 whereupon a criminal case was registered. In the said complaint, the place of incident was said to have taken place in House No. 151, Adarsh Nagar Narbada Road, Jabalpur. The period during which the incident took place was said to be before November, 1995 till 25.08.1997. It was alleged:

“7. That during the time of Dusshera the complainant’s husband Manish, Father in law S.S. Rattan, Mother in law Smt. Kiran and sister in law Menaka (Minni) illtreated her so much that she left her house and saved her life by some means and reached in her Mama’s house at Bhopal and from there she reached her house and since then she has been staying with her father.”

A criminal revision was filed by the appellants questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said criminal revision application has been dismissed opining that the offence being a continuing one, Datia Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence.

The High Court did not consider the question on the touchstone of Sections 177 and 178 of the Code. It is interesting to note that while arriving at the decision the High Court distinguished the decision of this Court in Sujata Mukherjee (Smt) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee [(1997) 5 SCC 30], stating:

“The High Court held that excepting against the husband, the complaint against other respondents related to the incidents taking place at Raigarh and as such, the criminal case on the basis of complaint made by the appellant was not maintainable against the said other respondents at Raipur but it was maintainable so far as the husband of the appellant was concerned. On these facts, the Apex Court took the view that the complaint reveals a continuing offence of the mal-treatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused  respondents, and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all the respondents had taken part and on other occasion, one of the respondents had taken part. It was, therefore, held that in view of clause (c) of Section 178 of Cr.P.C., the High Court was not right. The order passed by the High Court was set aside and the learned CJM, Raipur had jurisdiction to try the case. The facts of the present case are different. There is nothing in the complaint to show that any mal-treatment was given to the complainant at Datia. The allegations, which I may repeat here, are that the mal-treatment was given within a specific period at Jabalpur. There is nothing to show that any mal-treatment was given by any of the petitioners at Datia and under these circumstances, this case of Sujata Mukherjee does not help the learned counsel for the complainant in this case.”

By a curious process of reasoning, however, it was held:

“They demanded a sum of Rs. 7.00 lakhs and forced her to write a letter to her parents in that regard. She was beaten and kept starving. Somehow she managed to escape and went to her Mama’s place at Bhopal and from there she went to father’s place and was living there. Thus these facts go to show that she was forced to go to her father’s place on account of the fact that she was mal-treated; as demand of Rs. 7.00 lakhs was not fulfilled. As laid down in the aforesaid decision of this Court, the word ‘cruelty’ is not only the physical cruelty, the lady was forced to live at her father’s place on account of the torture of the inlaws and as such it can safely be said that there was also a mental cruelty. The cruelty and the terror of the in-laws continued even at the place of the father where she was living. In this view of the matter, it can safely be said that the harassment continued at the place where she was residing with her father. In view of the provision of Section 178 Cr.P.C., the offence may be inquired into and tried by a Court where the physical harassment, marpeet had taken place i.e. the in-laws’ place and also where the harassment continued i.e. the place where she was residing. Thus in view of the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid authority with which I respectfully agree, the Court at Datia had also jurisdiction to try the case.”

It is not denied or disputed that no part of cause of action arose within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Datia Court. Section 177 of the Code ordains that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.

Interpretation of the term “ordinarily” will have to be considered having regard to the provisions contained in Section 178 thereof which reads as under:

“178. Place of inquiry or trial.(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or

(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or

(c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or

(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas,

it may be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.”

Clause (c) of the said provision, thus, has been applied in the instant case.

Whether the allegations made in the complaint petition would constitute a continuing offence, thus, is the core question.

In a case of this nature, an offence cannot be held to be a continuing one, only because the complainant is forced to leave her matrimonial home.

In State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Another [(1972) 2 SCC 890], it was stated:

“A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobediance or non-compliance occurs and reoccurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues, and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all.”

In Sujata Mukherjee (supra) this Court held the offence to be a continuing one as specific allegations had been made against the husband that he had also gone to Raipur where the complaint was filed and had assaulted the appellant therein. It was in the aforementioned fact situation, this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court holding that the incident at Raipur was not an isolated event stating:

“At the hearing of these appeals, Mr Gambhir, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that it will be evident from the complaint that the appellant has alleged that she had been subjected to cruel treatment persistently at Raigarh and also at Raipur and incident taking place at Raipur is not an isolated event, but consequential to the series of incidents taking place at Raigarh. Therefore, the High Court was wrong in appreciating the scope of the complaint and proceeding on the footing that several isolated events had taken place at Raigarh and one isolated incident had taken place at Raipur. Hence, the criminal case filed in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur was only maintainable against the respondent husband against whom some overt act at Raipur was alleged. But such case was not maintainable against the other respondents.”

This Court having regard to the peculiar fact situation obtaining therein held:

“We have taken into consideration the complaint filed by the appellant and it appears to us that the complaint reveals a continuing offence of maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused respondents and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all the respondents had taken part and on other occasion, one of the respondents had taken part. Therefore, clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is clearly attracted. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and direct the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur to proceed with the criminal case”

Sujata Mukherjee (supra) was distinguished by a Division Bench of this Court in Y. Abraham Ajith and Others v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another [(2004) 8 SCC 100] where noticing the interpretation of the expression “cause of action”, it was held that the expression “ordinarily” need not be limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court. In that case the complaint itself disclosed that after 15.04.1997, the respondent left Nagercoil and went to Chennai and was staying there. Thus, having regard to the fact that all allegations according to the complainant took place at Nagercoil, it was held that the courts at Chennai did not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. It was held:

“This Court held in that factual background that clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the present case the factual position is different and the complainant herself left the house of the husband on 15-4-1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence much less at Chennai. That being so, the logic of Section 178(c) of the Code relating to continuance of the offences cannot be applied.”

Yet again in Ramesh and Others v. State of T.N. [(2005) 3 SCC 507], Abraham Ajith (supra) was followed by this Court stating:

“In the view we are taking, it is not necessary for us to delve into the question of territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Trichy in detail. Suffice it to say that on looking at the complaint at its face value, the offences alleged cannot be said to have been committed wholly or partly within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court at Trichy. Prima facie, none of the ingredients constituting the offence can be said to have occurred within the local jurisdiction of that court. Almost all the allegations pertain to acts of cruelty for the purpose of extracting additional property as dowry while she was in the matrimonial home at Mumbai and the alleged acts of misappropriation of her movable property at Mumbai. However, there is one allegation relevant to Section 498-A from which it could be inferred that one of the acts giving rise to the offence under the said section had taken place in Chennai. It is alleged that when the relations of the informant met her in-laws at a hotel in Chennai where they were staying on 13- 10-1998, there was again a demand for dowry and a threat to torture her in case she was sent back to Mumbai without the money and articles

demanded.

Thus the alleged acts which according to the petitioner constitute the offences under Sections 498-A and 406 were done by the accused mostly in Mumbai and partly in Chennai. Prima facie, there is nothing in the entire complaint which goes to show that any acts constituting the alleged offences were at all committed at Trichy.”

The said decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case.

Our attention was drawn to the fact that no criminal case was lodged at Jabalpur. Our attention was further drawn to the fact that the investigation of the case is complete.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that, interest of justice would be subserved, while setting aside the order of the High Court, if in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct transfer of the criminal case pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur. We accordingly do so.

Although the complainant has filed an application before us for impleading herself as a party, nobody has appeared on her behalf. We, therefore, direct the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur to issue notice to her. Keeping in view of the fact that Respondent No. 2 is residing at Datia, we would request the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur to accommodate her in the matter of fixing the date (s) of hearing as far as possible.

The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions.

Patna HC-IPC 498a Quashed-No Territorial Jurisdiction

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA

Cr. Misc. No.229 of 2008

DEBASISH DEY, SON OF LATE BIJAY KUMAR DEY, RESIDENT

OF B.G. COLONY, RAILWAY QUARTR NO. 6/B, POLICE STATION AND DISTRICT BONGAIGAON (ASSAM). .. PETITIONER.

Versus

1. THE STATE OF BIHAR.

2. SURINA RAJAN, WIFE OF DEBASISH DEY, RESIDENT OF B.G. COLONY, RAILWAY QUARTR NO. 6/B, POLIE STATION

BONGAIGAON, DISTRICT BONGAIGAON (ASSAM) AT PRESENT

RESIDING AT HOUSE NO. 2M/71, BAHADURPUR HOUSING

COLONY, MAHATMA GANDHI NAGAR, POLICE STATION

KANKARBAGH, DISTRICT PATNA.

———–

04/ 23.06.2010 This petition is directed against the order dated 06.09.2007 by which the cognizance has been taken by the SDJM, Patna in Complaint Case No. 943(C) of 2007 of the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and ordered to issue summon against the accused person.

2. The prosecution case as alleged in the complaint petition filed by the complainant is that the complainant Surina Ranjan was married with Debasish Dey on 24.09.2006 in the temple situated at Bagribari, Dhubari (Assam) according to the Hindu rites and rituals and the victim complainant appeared before Special Marriage Officer, Golpara along with the accused for registration of the marriage and marriage certificate was issued and the complainant began to live with her husband accused since 24.09.2006 at B. G. Colony, Railway Quarter No. 6/8 Bongaigaon, Assam. There is further allegation of demand of Rs.5,00000/- (five lacs) in December, 2006 and the complainant was pressurized to inform her father for sending rupees five lacs and thereafter there is allegation of subjecting 2

cruelty by different modes and means including assault. Then it is alleged that the complainant informed her maternal uncle to came at Bongaigaon and try to settle the matter and further on 15.03.2007 took her signature on plain paper including non judicial stamp by which the victim became sick and her treatment was going on.

3. The further case is that on 24.03.2007 the complainant learnt about the planning of the accused persons for dire consequence to her live and limb so she succeeded to flee away from her Sasural to her Naihar.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that all the act of committing or subjecting cruelty on the person of the victim are at Bongaigaon, much less, no part of the occurrence has taken place in the jurisdiction of the Panta district and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, has no jurisdiction and has relied upon decision reported in PLJR 2007(4) 192 (Prannath Gupta & Anr. Vs. The State of Bihar & Anr.), 2008 (3) PLJR 367 (Bhura Ram & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.) and 2009 (4) PLJR 1 SC Section (Shri Rajendra Ram Chandra Kavelekar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr.).

5. Learned counsel for the opposite party appeared and submitted that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence need not have territorial jurisdiction to try a case and any Judicial Magistrate has power to take cognizance and has relied upon decision reported in 1999 (8) SC 686 (Trisuns Chemical Industry Vs. Rajesh Agarwal & Ors.). In decision reported in 2008(3) PLJR 367 (Bhura Ram & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.) a complaint was lodged by Rajeshwari which was sent for institution of a case under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C to the 3

police station for investigation and FIR was lodged under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and allied sections of the Indian Penal Code. Challan was filed, charges were framed and the petitioner made a prayer before the Court that the Court of ACJM has no jurisdiction to try the offence as the cause of action accrued within the jurisdiction of other Court. The revision preferred before the Sessions Judge was rejected and High Court also dismissed the criminal case. Petition preferred by the petitioner against the order passed in revision holding that marriage solemnized at village Ramsara, District Firojpur and right from the marriage the complainant and her husband lived in Punjab and her in-laws and husband has died and now she is residing in Shri Gangadhar, District Rajasthan along with maternal relation and so still the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code being a continuing one, the complaint cannot be dismissed whereas the complainant is at present living and hence, the offence is still continuing within the local area of Rajasthan where, at present, the complainant is living and hence, the ACJM Ganganagar has jurisdiction to try the case. The court also found all the allegation regarding the offence charged which have been committed at the previous resident of the complainant and relying upon decision reported in 2004 (8) SCC 100 (Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr.) wherein this Court has held that cause of action having arisen within the jurisdiction of the court where the offence was committed could not be tried by the Court where no part of the offence was committed and hence under these facts it was held that having regard to the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant the inevitable 4

conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Rajasthan and therefore, the Magistrate concerned has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter and hence, quash the proceeding before the ACJM, Gandhinagar and ordered the complaint be returned to the complainant, if so, she wishes she may file the same in the appropriate court to be dealt with in accordance with law.

6. However, in decision reported in PLJR 2007(4) 192 (Prannath Gupta & Anr. Vs. The State of Bihar & Anr.) the case was for quashing the order of cognizance on the ground that the entire complaint showed that whatever incidence happened was at Patna matrimonial home of the complainant and finally ousted from the matrimonial home and thereafter she went back to Bhagalpur and there was no allegation of any demand at Bhagalpur and relying upon decision reported in AIR 2004 (8) SCC 100 (Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr.) held that since no cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court at Bhagalpur and hence, the Bhagalpur Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a complaint and quash the proceeding with a liberty to the complainant to take appropriate step for filing complaint before the appropriate court in decision reported in 2009 (4) PLJR 1 SC Section (Shri Rajendra Ram Chandra Kavelekar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr.). This was a case in which a case was filed under the jurisdiction of Ranchi in Jharkhand bearing R.C. Case No. 18 of 2004 for offence under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 13(2) and 13(1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act and a writ petition was filed before the High Court of Judicature at 5

Bombay on several other grounds that the Ranchi has no jurisdiction to register a case against the appellant since the entire cause of action has arisen in the State of Maharashtra and so the CBI, Ranchi has no locus to file a complaint against the appellant in respect of the offence mentioned in the charge and the petition having been rejected by the Bombay High Court, the appellant moved the Supreme Court and Supreme Court after considering the facts and circumstances held that the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of Suj-Judge, Ranchi. The investigation is complete at Ranchi. Records and the documents pertaining to the complainant and the charge sheet are before Special Judge, Ranchi and hence, the High Court of Judicature at Bombay was perfectly justified in declining to entertain the writ petition and rejected the application relying upon decision reported in 2007(7) SCC 640 (Navinchandra Majithia Vs. State of Maharastra) and 2007 (5) SCC 786 (Asit Bhattacharjee Vs. Hanuman Prasad Oja). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in all the three decision mentioned above held that the trial is to be conducted at a place where the place of occurrence falls or within the jurisdiction of the court where the occurrence has taken place and not the place where the complaint has been filed.

7. Learned counsel for the opposite party has relied upon decision reported in 1999 (8) SCC 686 (Trisuns Chemical Industry Vs. Rajesh Agarwar & Ors.) with diametric apposite contention that any Judicial Magistrate of First Class has jurisdiction to try a case. However, in decision reported in 1999 (8) SCC 686 (Trisuns Chemical Industry Vs. Rajesh Agarwar & Ors.) a complaint was filed by the company 6

before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class alleging certain offence including the offence of cheating against another complaint and its Director and the said complaint was sent for investigation under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. The accused Director moved the High Court of Gujarat under Section 482 for quashing the complaint and the Single Judge quashed the complaint as also the order passed by the Magistrate thereupon. The allegation in the complaint was, in sum and substance, that the accused Director approached him and offered to supply 5450 Metric Ton of Toasted Soabin Extraction for a price of merely four and half crores. The rate quoted was higher than marked price the appellant was to pay the price in advance as demanded by the accused, so the same was paid through cheque but the accused supplied the commodity of most inferior and sub-standard quality. The product and the report obtained from laboratory were sent for testing and it was reported that commodity was sub-standard causing a loss of Rs.17 lacs by said transaction. The learned Single Judge quashed the complaint on two grounds and one of them was the jurisdiction stating therein that there is nothing in the complaint which shows that any party of the transaction took place within the territory of State of Gujarat and also observed that it appears that even the supply of the processed Soabin were delivered to the complainant company at the factory itself and hence Judicial Magistrate, Ganghidham ought to not have taken cognizance. However, this view of the High Court was held to be erroneous on the ground that Magistrate taking cognizance must necessarily have territorial jurisdiction to try the case and Chapter XIII of the Cr.P.C relates to jurisdiction of the criminal court in enquiries 7

and trial but also considered Section 179 of the Cr.P.C which lays that the place shall cover even the jurisdiction where the consequence has ensued and said provision may give the power to court to take cognizance and further consider to take cognizance upon police report and interpreted that any Magistrate in Section 192 of the Cr.P.C as enshrined of first class may take cognizance of offence upon a police report or upon receiving a complaint and section 193 of the Cr.P.C only imposed a restriction. However, there is nothing in Chapter XIV to impair the power of Judicial Magistrate, First Class taking cognizance of the offence on the strength of territorial region. However, in para 14 of the same judgment it has been observed that jurisdictional aspect becomes relevant only when the question of enquiry or trial arises and it has further been observed that after taking cognizance the Magistrate may have to decide as to the court which has jurisdiction to enquire into or try the offence and then situation would reach only during the post cognizance stage and not earlier. Further in para 15 of the decision reported in 1999 (8) SCC 686 (Trisuns Chemical Industry Vs. Rajesh Agarwar & Ors.) it has been held that the High Court without considering any of the aforesaid legal aspect reached erroneous conclusion that the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Gandhidham has no jurisdiction to taken cognizance of the offence as alleged merely because such offence could have been committed out side the territorial limits of the State of Gujarat without being apprised of the fuller conspectus a decision on the question of jurisdiction should not have been taken by the High Court at a grossly premature stage. Hence, from perusal of paras 14 and 15 it is apparent that in the facts and circumstances 8

of this case FIR itself was quashed giving opportunity to the I.O or the Investigating Authority to go into the question of jurisdiction whether any part of the cause of action has arose in the territorial jurisdiction and even at the stage of investigation itself the FIR was quashed though this decision itself has held that taking into consideration the fact that the Magistrate has no territorial jurisdiction. He may have taken the decision to transfer it having found that there is no territorial jurisdiction at all after investigation and the most important aspects and facts that the learned Magistrate did not take into consideration the allegation and imputation of Section 179 regarding the consequence ensued as it was the company who was going at loss. However, if a part of cause of action arose at two places then the other place may have jurisdiction, however, under the present facts and circumstances of the case, since the case concerns with a complaint case and the investigation, the question for jurisdiction comes and falls during enquiry and trial. However, in a complaint case when the complaint is filed and the Magistrate applies its mind, the cognizance is said to have been taken at that stage itself when the Court applied its mind for proceeding with the complaint and taking the statement of the complainant and its witnesses and after taking this cognizance the stage of enquiry proceeds when the court proceeds to take the statement of the complainant and his witnesses and thereafter the stage of 203 and 204 of the Cr.P.C comes where the summon is either ordered to be issued if the court satisfies that offence is made out against the accused persons and the accused has implication in the crime and hence, in the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite party even in para 14 and 15 9

established that Chapter XIII is with regard to the enquiry and trial and hence, the jurisdiction is concerned not at the stage of cognizance but the jurisdiction of the Court applies for enquiry and trial though not at the stage of taking cognizance. Even applying this principle, the court has not territorial jurisdiction to enquire and hence the impugned order is an order issuing process against the accused persons after taking cognizance passing through the stage of enquiry and since no part of the cause of action arose in the territory of the Patna as alleged in the complaint petition and nothing has been show to take that any occurrence took place at Patna nor the consequence even ensue at Patna and hence the Patna Court has no territorial jurisdiction and hence the impugned order is not only the order of taking cognizance but order issuing process after taking cognizance in a complaint case which is squarely covered by the decision reported in 2008(3) PLJR 367 (Bhura Ram & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.) and PLJR 2009 (4) PLJR 1 SC Section (Shri Rajendra Ram Chandra Kavelekar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr.) as stated above and hence the impugned order is set aside and the petition is allowed.

Kundan (Gopal Prasad, J.)

Ranchi HC-IPC 498A/406 Quashed-No Territorial Jurisdiction

Jharkhand High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI

Cr.M.P. No.813 of 2008

1. Sunil Kumar Choudhary

2. Suman Prakash Choudhary @ Anil Kumar

3. Sudhir Kumar Choudhary @ Sudhir Kumar

4. Kaushal Kumar Choudhary @ Kaushal Kumar @ Kaushal Kishore Choudhary

5. Sunita Kumari

6. Sujanti Kumari

7. Madan Mohan Choudhary @ Bishu Choudhary

8. Shakuntala Devi

9. Sudha Devi @ Sudha Kumari

10. Kanhaiya @ Kanhaiya Choudhary- — – — – —Petitioners Versus

1. The State of Jharkhand

2. Pushplata Choudhary– — – — – — – — –Opposite Parties

CORAM : THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE D.K. SINHA

For the Petitioners : Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, Sr. Advocate M/s. Rishav Dev & Rajesh Kumar, Advocates

For the State : Mr. D.K. Prasad, A.P.P. For the Opp. Party No.2 : M/s. Manoj Kr. Sah & Md. Imteyaz Ashrad, Advocates

—–

Reserved on: 6-1-2011 Pronounced on: 04 – 02-2011

D.K. Sinha, J. The petitioners have invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure for quashment of the entire criminal prosecution arising out of Complaint Case No.664 /07 pending before the S.D.J.M., Ranchi including the order impugned dated 19.5.2008 by which cognizance of the offence was taken under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.

2. Prosecution story in short was that the opposite party No.2 was married to the accused-petitioner No.1 on 21.6.1999 according to Hindu rites and customs prevalent at Dumka where her father was posted there during service. After her marriage, she went to her matrimonial home at Maksudpur in the district of Patna. It was alleged in the complaint that within a month of her marriage, the accused persons started extending torture and subjecting her to inhumane behaviour and cruelty and they started demanding Rs.5,00,000/- to be brought from her parental home in spite of the fact that valuable gifts were presented to her on the eve of her marriage. As the parents of the complainant had financial constraints to meet out such unreasonable demand, they tried their sincere efforts to 2

persuade the accused persons to keep the complainant properly and humanely but of no avail. It was alleged that the complainant at times was kept confined in the room without food and water and used to be assaulted at their hands. Yet, the father of the complainant used to make over certain amounts to the husband-petitioner No.1 from time to time but it did not satisfy the greed of the accused persons. When the complainant became pregnant, she was sent back to Ranchi where her father was posted on transfer from Dumka. She delivered a male child at Ranchi but none of them including her husband-petitioner No.1 ever cared to see or to take care of either the complainant or newly born child. After some time, she returned back to her matrimonial home where she was again subjected to cruelty and mental harassment. Although she tried to cope with the situation but all the accused humiliated by putting remarks that she had illicit relation with one Sudhir Kumar Choudhary, who was the accused No.3 in the complaint case and ultimately, she was driven out from her matrimonial home in the month of January, 2004 and that finding no way out, she took shelter at her parental home. But prior to that, her almirah was broken open by the accused persons and all her valuable belongings and jewelleries were removed by them. On 15.5.2004, she returned back to her matrimonial home with one Shayam Babu Choudhary but she was asked to bring Rs.5,00,000/- for her entry in the matrimonial home. They further refused to return back her jewelleries and other valuables. Finding no way out, she lodged a Complaint Case No.691/04 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi for the alleged offence under Sections 498A/406 Indian Penal Code against the accused. Simultaneously, she initiated a proceeding under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against her husband petitioner No.1 in the court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi being Maintenance Case No.64/2004. During pendency of both the cases, husband-petitioner No.1 came to Ranchi and offered to resolve the dispute with the complainant on his assurance and undertaking that he would properly behave with her and would not demand anything from her parents. Husband-petitioner further undertook that none of his relatives would extend cruelty to her in any manner. Upon such assurance given by her husband-petitioner No.1 Sunil Kumar Choudhary in presence of the accused No.10 Kanhaiya, she expressed her willingness to accompany her husband to Patna and in that process, compromise petition was filed before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi which was accepted and thereafter, Complain Case No.691/04, which she had filed for the alleged offence under Sections 498A/406 of the Indian Penal Code was withdrawn. She was then taken to her matrimonial home at Maksudpur but the accused persons with the little pause again started similar behaviour to her by extending mental and 3

physical torture. She was then taken to Anisabad and from there to Patliputra Colony, Patna, but her miseries did not end here and she had been pressurized to bring money from her parental home, lest her father would be responsible for the consequences which would may happen in future with her. It was further alleged that petitioner No. 2 and petitioner No.5 forcibly tried to send her to Ranchi but she refused. However, on 2.2.2007 she was informed that her husband was at Ranchi, who wanted her to be there to finalize certain issues with her father at Ranchi and on such pretext, she was taken to Ranchi by the accused persons, who left her at the bus stand, asking that she would not be accepted by her husband and in-laws until she would carry Rs.5,00,000/-. Her minor son was forcibly retained by the accused persons. That apart, it was seriously alleged that her husband insisted her to live with accused No.3 Sudhir Kumar Choudhary and thereby extreme form of cruelty was demonstrated.

3. Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, the learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, at the outset submitted that the entire criminal proceedings against the petitioners as well as the order by which cognizance of the offence was taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate was bad in law as the same was lacking territorial jurisdiction in view of the fact that no part of the cause of action took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the C.J.M./ S.D.J.M., Ranchi. Learned Sr. Counsel further submitted that the offence under which the cognizance was taken by the court was not a continuing offence, as such, the same could not be tried at Ranchi. Cognizance of the offence under Sections 498A/406/120-B of the Indian Penal Code was taken mechanically as the territorial jurisdiction of the court was not examined since the contents of the complaint reflected that no part of occurrence took place within the territorial jurisdiction of C.J.M., Ranchi and therefore, the entire criminal prosecution of the petitioners was liable to be quashed.

4. In Bhura Ram and others versus State of Rajasthan and another, reported in (2008)11 Supreme Court Cases 103, the Apex Court of India held, “The facts stated in the complaint disclose that the complainant left the place where she was residing with her husband and in-laws and came to the city of Sri Ganganagar, State of Rajasthan and that all the alleged acts as per the complaint had taken place in the State of Punjab. The court at Rajasthan does not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. On the basis of the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Rajasthan and, therefore, the Magistrate concerned has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. As a consequence thereof, the proceedings before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar are quashed. The complaint be returned to the complainant and if she so wishes she may file the same in the appropriate court to be dealt with in accordance with law.”

4

5. Learned counsel, Mr. Manoj Kr. Sah, appearing on behalf of the opposite party No.2, did not dispute the legal position except by stating that the opposite party No.2 having been forced to leave her matrimonial home preceded by torture and demand of money would come within the purview of mental cruelty and harassment which continued even at the place where she returned back to her father at Ranchi and therefore, no error was caused by the C.J.M., Ranchi while taking cognizance of the offence and the learned S.D.J.M., Ranchi found prima facie case against the accused petitioners for the alleged offence under Sections 498A/406/120- B of the Indian Penal Code.

6. Supreme Court of India in Manish Ratan and others versus State of M.P. and another, reported in (2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases 262 held, “7. It is not denied or disputed that no part of cause of action arose within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Datia court. Section 177 of the Code ordains that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.

8. Interpretation of the term “ordinarily” will have to be considered having regard to the provisions contained in Section 178 thereof which read as under:

“178. Place of inquiry or trial.-(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or

(c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or

(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas,

it may be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.”

9. Clause (c) of the said provision, thus, has been applied in the instant case.

10. Whether the allegations made in the compliant petition would constitute a continuing offence, thus, is the core question.

11. In a case of this nature, an offence cannot be held to be a continuing one, only because the complainant is forced to leave her matrimonial home.”

7. In view of the legal and factual position, this petition is allowed. The order impugned, by which the learned S.D.J.M., Ranchi found a prima facie case against the petitioners for the alleged offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained under law as the same was recorded without considering that no part of the alleged act did take place in his territorial jurisdiction. Accordingly, such order and the entire criminal prosecution of the petitioners in Complaint Case No.664 /07 are set aside, however, with the liberty to the complainant-opposite party No.2 to file any such complaint in the court of competent territorial jurisdiction.

(D.K. Sinha, J.)

S.B./A.F.R.

Ranchi HC-IPC 498A Quashed-No Territorial Jurisdiction

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI

Cr.M.P. No. 1612 of 2007

1. Manjit Kumar Singh

2. S.K. Singh @ Satyendra Kumar Singh

3. Sanjit Suman

4. Hemant Kumar Singh

5. Mona Singh– — – — – — — –Petitioners Versus

1. State of Jharkhand

2. Rakhee Singh– — – — – — – — –Opposite Parties

CORAM : THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE D.K. SINHA

For the Petitioners : Mr. P.P.N. Roy, Sr. Advocate M/s. S.P. Sinha & P.A.N. Roy, Advocates

For the State : Mr. M.A. Khan, A.P.P.

For the Opp. Party No.2 : M/s. Indrajit Sinha & Bibhash Sinha, Advocates —–

10/20.4.2011 Petitioners have invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashment of the order dated 21.9.2007, passed by Sri A.K. Tiwary, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur in Complaint Case No.C-1-1250/2007 by which the Court found a prima facie case under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners and summons were directed to be issued against them. The petitioners further requested for quashment of the entire criminal proceedings arising out of the said complaint case.

2. Short facts of the case as narrated in Complaint Case No.C-1-1250/2007 filed by the complainant-opposite party No.2 Rakhee Singh is that she was married to the petitioner No.1 Manjit Kumar Singh on 27.6.2004 at Patna in the house of Sri H.C. Singh related to Manjit Kumar Singh and after the marriage, she was taken to Jamui where her matrimonial home was situated. At the time of her engagement, Rs.2,00,000/- was given in cash and the father of the complainant promised to pay Rs.5,00,000/- and one Alto car before the Tilak ceremony of the groom, but later on her father agreed to pay Rs.10,00,000/- in cash and it was paid to the father of the groom before the marriage. Misery of the complainant started after two days of her marriage when she was brought to her matrimonial home where all the members of her matrimonial home stopped talking to her and even no meal was offered to her. On query, her husband explained that the members of his family were annoyed with her because TV, Fridge, Washing Machine and other articles were not given by way of presentation on the eve of her marriage. She tried to explain that her father had already spent Rs.15,00,000/- on her marriage whereupon her husband Manjit Kumar Singh slapped and abused her and other accused persons also assaulted and abused asking her to return back to her father’s home. She informed and her father immediately came to Jamui, who was also ill-treated at the hands of the accused. The father of the complainant could be agreed to meet out their demands. The complainant then proceeded to Delhi with the consent of her husband and her father had given Rs.70,000/- for purchasing household articles. In the month of January, 2006 her husband’s uncle came to Delhi with four other persons for his treatment and on that occasion also, her husband who was there asked the complainant to contact her father to send Rs.20,000/- for his treatment, to which she refused to do so whereupon she was assaulted by her husband Manjit Kumar Singh, Mona Singh and Hemant Kumar Singh with fists and blows. She was locked in a room for several hours and she was released only when she agreed to ask her Mausa to come to Delhi with a draft of Rs.10,000/-. In the meantime, she conceived and her husband was advised by his sister Mona Singh for her abortion, if her father was not ready to take her back to his house till delivery. The complainant declined for abortion. In the meantime, she became seriously ill and then she was taken to Jamui i.e. her matrimonial home by her husband and his brother Sanjit Suman against her will without treatment. After some time, she was again taken back to Delhi and on 4 th May while she was preparing her last paper for examination, a ticket was handed over by Sanjit Suman to her for Jamshedpur and when she refused to go back to Jamshedpur, she was again assaulted and forcibly she was taken by her husband to Jamshedpur on 3.8.2006 where he stayed for three days and during such stay he insisted her to ask her father to transfer his Flat No.306 situated at Rakesh Tower in his name, to which she denied, whereupon her husband got furiated and suddenly returned back to Delhi asking the complainant never to come to him unless her father agreed to transfer the said flat in his name. On 28.9.2006, a son was born to the complainant and the news was given to her husband and other members of the family but neither any one came to Jamshedpur nor any message was sent to her. Her father went to Jamui and requested the father-in-law of his daughter to take her back at her matrimonial home but the father-in-law severed relationship by saying that his son did not want to live with her any more and that he refused to return the ornaments/jewelleries of the complainant, which were kept in the Bank locker. Persuasion was made by the father of the complainant to his son-in-law to settle the matter, to which he proposed that his flat should be transferred in the name of the son of the complainant or to pay Rs.10,00,000/- for the composition of a case related to a motor accident claim in which he was an accused and a person died in a motor accident at his instance. The father of the complainant returned back without any settlement and in this manner, the petitioners committed offence under Sections 498A/406 of the Indian Penal Code as also under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as alleged in the complaint petition.

3. Mr. P.P.N. Roy, the learned senior counsel, at the outset, submitted that he was not inclined to press the petition of the petitioner No.1 Manjit Kumar Singh i.e. the husband of the complainant and wanted to withdraw his petition for quashment however, with the liberty to agitate the matter before the competent court at the appropriate stage for his discharge. The prayer is allowed with such liberty.

4. Raising the point of law, Mr. Roy submitted that no part of the occurrence took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court of Sri A.K. Tiwary, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur so as to draw the impugned order dated 21.9.2007 by which he found a prima facie case against the accused persons under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and directed summons to be issued against them by fixing the date on 28.9.2007 for filing requisites.

5. Mr. Roy further submitted that from the plain reading of the Complaint Case No.C-1-1250/2007 and the statement of the complainant recorded on her solemn affirmation, it could be gathered that no part of the occurrence took place at Jamshedpur except the averments made in para-13 of the complaint petition wherein it was stated that her husband Manjit Kumar Singh took her to Jamshedpur on 3.8.2006 and made unlawful demand of the property, to which the complainant denied to ask her father for transfer of his flat in the name of her husband whereupon Manjit Kumar Singh got furiated and suddenly left for Delhi extending threat to the complainant not to come to him at Delhi unless her father agreed to transfer the flat in his name, but the petitioner-husband is permitted to withdraw his case and therefore, the cognizance of the offence and the order impugned by which a prima facie case was found against the remaining petitioners under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur was barred by jurisdiction under Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the alleged cruelty was perpetrated either at Jamui within the State of Bihar or in Delhi. He further submitted that the offence alleged by which a prima facie case was found against the petitioners was not a continuing offence, as such, same could not be tried at Jamshedpur and the learned C.J.M. without due diligence and application of judicial mind took the cognizance and transferred the complaint case in the court of Judicial Magistrate for inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

6. In Bhura Ram and others versus State of Rajasthan and another, reported in 2008(4) East Cr C 86 (SC), the Apex Court of India held, “The facts stated in the complaint disclose that the complainant left the place where she was residing with her husband and in-laws and came to the city of Sri Ganganagar, State of Rajasthan and that all the alleged acts as per the complaint had taken place in the State of Punjab. The court at Rajasthan does not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. On the basis of the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Rajasthan and, therefore, the Magistrate concerned has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. As a consequence thereof, the proceedings before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar are quashed. The complaint be returned to the complainant and if she so wishes she may file the same in the appropriate court to be dealt with in accordance with law.”

7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant-opposite party No.2 very fairly conceded that it was the husband Manjit Kumar Singh, according to the recital of the complaint case, who had visited Jamshedpur along with his wife-complainant and it was alleged that he had raised demand that the flat, which was in the name of her father, be transferred in his name and left the place leaving the complainant there. No part of the alleged offence has been attributed against any of the remaining petitioners.

8. In view of the legal and factual position discussed above, this petition is allowed. The order impugned by which the learned Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur found a prima facie case against the petitioners except the husband Manjit Kumar Singh under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained under law as the same was recorded without considering that no part of the offence was attributed against the remaining petitioners, which did take place in his territorial jurisdiction. Accordingly, entire criminal proceedings of the petitioners S.K. Singh @ Satyendra Kumar Singh, Sanjit Suman, Hemant Kumar Singh and Mona Singh including the order dated 21.9.2007 in so far as it relates to these petitioners passed in Complaint Case No.C-1-1250/2007 is set aside. This petition is allowed in the manner indicated above.

(D.K. Sinha, J.)